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ABSTRACT
The Effects of an Employment Tax Enforcement Regime on US Small Business and
Proprietor Payment Compliance
by
Rafael Dacal
April 2017
Chair: Dr. Detmar W. Straub, Jr
Major Academic Unit: J. Mack Robinson College of Business
This study attempted to identify ways to improve voluntary compliance and
minimize taxpayer burden, but also tries to understand the behavior of taxpayers’
compliance given the compliance regimen. Most explicitly, it attempted to identify ways
to improve payment compliance using regimens already utilized in other parts of the tax
code. The research question was whether different tax regimes, such as safe harbor, can
change the behavior of employment tax payment for small business or self-employed
taxpayers. The idea was to determine if a safe harbor provision can reduce the proclivity
of authorized individuals to implement a payroll tax dilemma strategy and whether or
regimen can reduce payment noncompliance in time of economic distress. To answer the
research question, an online experiment was employed. The experimental design was an
impact study. The population of interest in this study was all authorized individuals from
small and self-employed firms. The sample size totaled 205, and it was based on the apriori sample size calculation. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was chosen as the data
analysis technique, but other nonparametric test and logistic regression models were used
to further analyze the data. This study showed that for subjects who did not subscribed to

xiv

safe harbor provision but experienced an increased probability of apprehension increased
their payment compliance. Also, the availability of a safe harbor provision lead to a large
numbers to a safe harbor provision subscription in order to avoid enforcement. This
study was able to show that individuals were willing to improve their payment
compliance rate when enforcement was increased. The General Deterrence Theory
explains that increased deterrence will lead to higher compliance. The study showed a 10
percent improvement in payment compliance when safe harbor was implemented. The
results from this study also suggest that provisions such as a safe harbor can be a method
of reducing filing costs and audit costs and ultimately taxpayer burden. On the other
hand, the results of this study were inconclusive in determining if such provisions can
improve payment compliance. Nevertheless, the outcome of this study can improve
timing and accuracy of employment taxes payments and it may improve the accuracy of
employment tax payment.

INDEX WORDS: Employment tax, compliance, payment compliance, employment tax
enforcement regime, Small Business, experimental design, ANOVA,
nonparametric test, General Deterrence Theory, audit, tax enforcement, risk
attitude scale, online experiment
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I

INTRODUCTION

Taxes are as old as humanity and so is tax noncompliance. Therefore, even
though the concept of noncompliance is ancient, the in-depth study of tax compliance
only began around the late 1960s. One definition of tax compliance was articulated in
Gregory v. Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935) decision, which states that as long as
information is complete, timely, and accurate under the tax code, no taxpayer is bound
under any sense of “patriotic duty” (69 F.2d 811) to pay more than their fair share.
Conversely, the act of not filing taxes with information that is complete, timely, and
accurate is noncompliance, whether the act is deliberate or accidental.
On a positive note, the vast majority of taxpayers comply properly with their
complete tax obligation, but noncompliance remains the major reason for the existence of
the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In general, the IRS enforces compliance via the
National Research Program (NRP). This program randomly selects a stratified sample of
approximately 50,000 to intensively audit. Using this audit information, IRS develops
internal algorithms for case scoring and workload case selection and for calculating the
tax gap. However, the number of audits over the last several years has been decreasing
mainly due to budgetary constraints and employee attrition. In an optimal environment,
random selection would be used in all audit cases to maximize compliance (Bloomquist,
2009). However due to the aforementioned constraints, the Service is trying to find ways
to improve voluntary payment, filling, and reporting compliance, including variants on
employment tax.
Taxpayer compliance can be sub categorized into three types: payment, filling,
and reporting compliance (Brown & Mazur, 2003). Payment compliance is the accurate
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payment of tax liabilities. Filing compliance is the complete, timely, and accurate filing
of tax forms. Reporting compliance is the correct reporting of tax amounts owed to the
US government. Of the three sub categories, this study focused on the first type, payment
compliance of employment tax. While there have been numerous experimental studies
on compliance, none has focused on employment tax. This is important because one of
the major focuses for the Service has been to improve voluntary compliance of
employment tax, which accounts for about 72 billion dollars of the tax gap, which is any
misreporting and eventual underpayment of tax liability. Currently, the tax gap
associated with employment tax is equivalent to the budgets of the Energy Department,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the Commerce Department combined.
In addition to the financial importance of understanding this tax base, this study
focused on payment compliance because most of the employment tax noncompliance
arises from payment noncompliance. This phenomenon occurs because employment tax
has a very high level of information matching, so it is relatively easy to detect filing and
reporting noncompliance. This is a primary motivation for the current study in that
results here could be used to improve voluntary compliance efforts and reduce taxpayer
burden. In addition, efforts that advance our understanding of compliance in this
circumstance could reduce the 72 billion dollar US tax gap.
Employment tax and income tax withheld from employees’ pay is reported using
Form 941 “Employer’s QUARTERLY Federal Tax Return” or one of the forms in the
94x series. To assist employers in completing and complying with the necessary forms,
the IRS publishes Publication 15 (Circular E). This publication provides the guideline
employers should follow when filing and depositing employment tax.
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One of the requirements is to file employment tax at a regular interval, depending
on different tax liability thresholds. In most cases, firms are required to deposit their tax
liability on a bi-weekly or monthly basis to avoid incurring penalties and falling behind
on payments. However, there are times when companies facing economic distress will
use employment tax withholding to overcome liquidity shortcomings (Grady, 2013).
This business decision is defined as the “payroll tax dilemma” (pg.1) and the legal
liability is associated with an authorized individual. An authorized individual is someone
who is personally liable for the payment of employment tax withholdings deposits.
The payroll tax dilemma is when a firm cannot meet its operational liabilities and
illegally uses employment tax withholdings to pay against the firm’s liabilities (Godfrey,
2004; Mauldin & Wilder, 1997). The problem that arises from the payroll tax dilemma
strategy is that many of these businesses continue to illegally borrow from withheld taxes
for lengthening periods of time and Grady (2013) found this strategy will inevitably lead
to firm failure.
The present study first assumes that authorized individuals will succumb to the
payroll tax dilemma during business crises. We define business crises as an income
shock, which reduces firms’ revenues. The argument is that individuals decide to use
employment tax withholding as a short-term loan without clearly understanding the
negative implications. Some of the implications could be increased interest and penalties
and personal financial responsibilities on amounts due. To examine downstream effects,
we introduced a safe harbor1 provision to determine if an intervention minimized the
incidence of the payroll tax dilemma.

1

A safe harbor provision specifies conditions that protect individuals or firms from being deemed in
violation of the Internal Revenue Code and subject to an IRS audit
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Lastly, this study sets out to enhance the body of knowledge on employment tax
payment compliance by studying the employment tax payment behavior exhibited by
sole-proprietors and small business owners. Although the literature on tax compliance is
extensive, the literature has not taken a great interest in the issue of employment tax
compliance and even less on the issue of employment tax payment compliance. It is not
clear from the literature as to why this topic has not been addressed given its large
economic implications, but unavailability of data and lack of record matching have been
some of the possible reasons. With that said, there have been some changes to the tax
code and advances in the technology, both of which may allow for additional studies of
this particular segment of the tax base.
Nevertheless, the dearth of studies is puzzling given there is a consensus in the
literature that small business and sole proprietors are more likely to be noncompliant than
other filing groups (Rasholnikov, 2006). The current study allowed subjects to misreport,
but it also instituted an audit regimen and imposed a penalty. By testing the changes in
behavior of authorized individuals given the requisite reporting compliance regimen, we
attempted to identify ways to improve voluntary compliance and minimize taxpayer
burden, but also to better understand the behavior of employment tax payment
compliance.
The dissertation was divided in six sections. Section 2 provides the practical
motivation that drove this research study. Section 3 lists the central research question
that this study set out to answer. Section 4 reviews the current body of knowledge,
starting from the broad scope of taxes to a narrower scope of employment taxes and tax
compliance. Section 5 provides the theoretical motivation and theoretical model used to

5

test the research question. Section 6 provides a synopsis to the literature review. Section
7 list hypotheses in this study. Section 8 details the methods used to achieve the research
objective. The section will include experimental design and statistical tests. Section 9
provides the finding obtained by the experiment. Section 10 provides discussion and
conclusion identified from the findings section. Section 11 list the limitations associated
with the design and potential future research that could improve the body of knowledge
relevant to employment tax payment compliance. All relevant forms and additional
information are included in Appendices.
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II

PRACTICAL MOTIVATION

The practical motivation for this study was to improve our understanding of
reporting and voluntary compliance of employment tax payment. It is possible that from
this research study the Internal Revenue Service will modify certain employment tax
reporting and payment processes. These changes could lead to a lower taxpayer burden,
such as a reduction in filing costs and audit costs, thus enhancing and adhering to the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights. On the other hand, this project should also provide the IRS with
improvements to its tax compliance and tax collection process and policies. Therefore,
the proposed outcome could improve timing and accuracy of employment tax payment,
and could improve the accuracy of employment tax Federal Tax Deposits.
II.1 Employment Tax Motivation
The current tax code allows business owners to deduct legitimate expenses from
the owners’ tax income. This process is normally done using Form 1040 Schedule C –
Profit or loss from small business (or sole proprietorship) or Form 1120 - U.S.
Corporation Income Tax Return.2 However, these legitimate expenses do not preclude
business or nonprofit entities from having employment tax liabilities. The general
misstatement of expenses by business owners may lead to underreporting and
underpayment of all tax liabilities. These actions costs the US government and,
ultimately the citizenry, billions of dollars and it is termed the tax gap3 (IRS, 2012b), and
it unfairly impacts those who voluntarily pay their fair share of taxes. Of the estimated
tax gap of $450 billion dollars, $122 billion are from Business income, $67 billion are
from corporate income taxes and $72 billion are from employment taxes (IRS, 2012b).
2
3

Examples of expenses that could be deducted are advertising, car expenses, and depletion.
The tax gap is the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid.
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The tax gap is a good indicator of tax non-compliance (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein,
1998) and it accounts for approximately 15 to 17 percent of noncompliance (Mazar &
Ariely, 2006; Winchester, 2009), but a larger percent of the tax gap is a direct result of
non-filing and underreporting (Blumenthal, Christian, & Slemrod, 1998). Given the cost
associated with enforcement, the IRS believes that improving voluntary compliance is
necessary to reduce the tax gap (IRS, 2009).
In addition, the IRS is responsible for ensuring that taxpayers understand and
meet their tax obligations. Among those obligations is the filing and payment of
employment tax. Employment tax is the levies incurred by both an employer and
employee when the employee is paid for services rendered. These levies, or tax
liabilities, include social security, Medicare, Federal Unemployment (FUTA) and
individual income tax. For all the aforementioned taxes, the two parties are not always
responsible to pay or to match the amount owed. For example, the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC or the code) requires employers to match the social security and Medicare
taxes the employee pays after earning income. On the other hand, the code only requires
employers to pay for FUTA, but it is not a requirement for employees. This filing
process requires sole-proprietors, partnerships, and corporations to file and deposit
employment tax every time an employee works and incurs taxes beyond a certain tax
liability threshold.
Lastly, the IRS obtains employment tax filing and reporting information from
employees (through W-2 or W-3 filing) and employers (through Form Series 94X
filling). This set of information is used to assess the accuracy of employment tax
reporting. To do so, the IRS matches the information on the W-2 forms against the
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information reported on the 94X forms. Then, the IRS can identify cases were
discrepancies exist (i.e., W-2 amount ≠ Form 94X amount). For those cases with
discrepancies, the accuracy of the employment tax filing by the firms are suspect and
could lead to some form of an audit (field or correspondence).
Table 1: Employment Taxes Civil Penalties Assessed, Fiscal Year 2014
Employment taxes:
Civil penalties, total
Accuracy
Bad check
Delinquency
Estimated tax
Failure to pay
Federal tax deposits
Fraud
Other

Penalties assessed (in $1000)
6,946,702
2,593
480,174
1,429,205
6,155
3,495,287
1,532,364
455
469

Source SOI Tax Stats - IRS Data Book4

As the data in Table 1 suggests, reporting for employment tax by businesses is
relatively accurate and one of the contributing factors is the matching of information to
determine inaccuracies and the corresponding high-level audits. The Table 1 also shows
that accuracy only accounts for a negligible percent of cases where penalties were
assessed.5 On the other hand, failure-to-pay accounts for 50.3 percent of penalties
assessed. This is why this study focused on payment compliance of employment tax and
not filing compliance.
II.2 Compliance Motivation
According to Bloomquist (2009) the best way to accurately determine taxpayer
compliance would be to use random audits. Although small corporation audit coverage
has increased over the last decade, there has been a substantial drop over the past two
4

This table is an extract from “Table 17. Civil Penalties Assessed and Abated, by Type of Tax and Type of
Penalty, Fiscal Year 2014” obtained on 06/20/2015 at http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-CivilPenalties-Assessed-and-Abated-by-Type-of-Tax-and-Type-of-Penalty-IRS-Tax-Stats-Table-17
5
For penalties to be assessed an audit must be conducted and changes to the filing information were made
by revenue agent.
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years (IRS, 2014a). Given the current IRS noncompliance identification methods,
shrinking enforcement personnel budgets, and the cost of random audits, the IRS is trying
to find ways to improve employers’ voluntary payment, filing, and reporting compliance
for employment tax.
On the other hand, TIGTA (2011, 2014a, 2014b) found that there are issues with
the NRP employment tax database making it harder for the Service to identify
compliance issues with filing and payment. This shortcoming makes it more difficult for
the Service to identify compliance issues. Nevertheless, the current system is believed to
be the most reliable method currently available (Andreoni et al., 1998). Furthermore, the
IRS is currently using record matching criteria to identify potential field audit6. While a
small percent of employer go through a filed audit, close to 100 percent of the
employment tax filings go through an automated (computer base) audit. These audits
could be characterized as computerize verification or automated audits, and taxpayers are
seldom contacted or may only receive an IRS letter or notice. For this research, the focus
was not on the automated process, but on the most labor-intensive audits that require a
revenue agent to conduct a physical audit. The reasoning for this narrower focus was that
physical audits are costly and IRS budgets are shrinking.
As the These initiatives included revising the collection due process for
employment taxes and studying employment tax reporting and filing compliance (IRS,
2009) which included topics such as the Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) Alerts and using
NRP to improve the employment tax compliance characteristics. This study built on the

6

IRS.gov defines a filed audit as an interview that may take place “at the taxpayer's home, place of
business, or accountant's office”
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simplification of employment tax payment, which Bloomquist (2003b) states it could lead
to increased compliance.

Figure 1 shows, the US government has been incurring deficits since the 1970s.
Over most of that time, deficits did not account for a sizable percentage of GDP and
during the late 90s surpluses were incurred. As a result of these long running deficits, the
IRS began calculating and identifying ways to reduce the tax gap (Brown & Mazur,
2003; Holland, 1958; IRS, 1996). As a result of the ‘great recession’ and the raise of the
US deficits to 9.7 percent of GDP (St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, 2014), the IRS
instituted initiatives to curtail the $72 billion Tax gap from employment tax (IRS, 2009).
These initiatives included revising the collection due process for employment
taxes and studying employment tax reporting and filing compliance (IRS, 2009) which
included topics such as the Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) Alerts and using NRP to improve
the employment tax compliance characteristics. This study built on the simplification of
employment tax payment, which Bloomquist (2003b) states it could lead to increased
compliance.
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Figure 1: United States Federal Surplus or Deficits from September 1977 to
September 2013
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III RESEARCH QUESTION
The research question is whether different tax regimes, such as safe harbor, can
change the behavior of employment tax payment for small business or self-employed
taxpayers. The research is important in order to better appreciate the incentives that
government agencies worldwide might be able to use to encourage voluntary tax
compliance.

13

IV

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section covers the key literature of employment (or trust) tax, reporting
compliance and payment compliance. The literature streams associated with this study
are extensive. The following highlight will provide information on the current state of
knowledge and how the current research could increase the body of knowledge. The
figure below depicts the study literature space and how employment tax, payment
compliance, and reporting compliance overlap. Next, a general review on the tax
literature will be provided. That will followed by an extensive literature review on
employment tax, reporting compliance, and payment compliance.

Figure 2: Literature Review Space
IV.1 Tax
Taxation is as old as human society, and corvée was one of its earliest forms. The
concept of corvée required individuals in antiquities to provide labor in lieu of taxes.
One of the first references of tax payment comes from the Bible – specifically Exodus7 –
in the form of a poll tax. As one can imagine, the tax literature is extensive, with
academic journal articles going as far back as 1815 (Jay, 1815). Needless to say, the
7

The amount was half a shekel for every grown man as stated in Exodus 30:11-16 from
https://www.bible.com/bible/1/exo.30.
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depth of this literature could be attributed to the direct impact that taxation has on aspects
of everyday life. Some of these aspects are corporate strategy, personal income tax, and
employment tax. Since this study is positioned within the tax literature, a general review
of the tax literature provides some current issues discussed in the literature and how they
may relate to the present scope of study.
Given the broad scope of the tax literature, our attention will be focused on issues
in corporate and income tax because of their relationship to the literature in this study. In
the domain of corporate tax, there has been plenty of work on tax planning, tax
avoidance, and corporate responsibility8. The tax planning literature is related to law
literature and tax avoidance and evasion are more deeply discussed in the economics
literature (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Corporate responsibility typically can be found in
the ethics literature.
The corporate tax planning literature covers the impact that global tax jurisdiction
has on multinational tax strategy. Buettner and Wamser (2013) define tax planning as the
employment of “profit-shifting techniques that only require the adjustment of the internal
structure of the multinational firm” (pg. 63). Essentially, companies are employing these
strategies to reduce tax liability (Donohoe, McGill, & Outslay, 2014; Markie &
Shackelford, 2012) with mixed or minimal results (Buettner & Wamser, 2013; Donohoe,
McGill, & Outslay, 2013).9 Nevertheless, these tax strategies provide some competitive
advantage and firms defend their use (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, & Omer, 2015;
Manzon, Sharp, & Travlos, 1994).

8
9

Corporate responsibility is discussed in detail in the appendix.
It is important to note that tax avoidance is legal whereas tax evasion is not.
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Tax avoidance, is the legal minimization of one’s tax liability. Tax evasion is the
illegal practice of not filing or paying taxes. Both of these tax strategies, which takes on
different forms, has been around since the dawn of taxes. Some common avoidance
techniques are tax shelters10 and complex hybrid securities (Gallemore, Maydew, &
Thornock, 2014). Salihu, Sheikh Obid, and Annuar (2013) have defined tax avoidance as
the action of tax planning or managing of tax liabilities. Tax avoidance can be measured
in two ways: reported tax versus financial statements and the proportion of reported tax to
business income (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Salihu et al., 2013). Donohoe (2015) also
stated, “Derivatives allow planners to negate, extend, or expand the formal arrangements
and results on which tax liability is based” (pg.37), creating further tax avoidance.
As with corporate tax, the personal income literature has investigated critical
issues related to taxation. Within this domain, topics include tax reform and tax credits.
Of all the issues found in the income tax discourse, tax reform is normally at the top. The
current Internal Revenue Code has more than 70,000 pages and over 9,000 sections, not
including regulations and informative publications. Therefore, it is safe to say that the
US tax code is complex and its citizenship is interested in reforming it. Barney, Tschopp,
and Wells (2012) explain that “frequent change, excessive detail, ambiguity, burdensome
recordkeeping, numerous calculations, and confusing forms” (pg. 9) makes the tax
system more complex. Marcuss et al. (2013) estimated that the cost of tax complexity on
taxpayers exceed $150 billion in the US. The complexity is so sizeable that it remains
the largest cost burden for small business, even after decades of simplification and
deregulation initiatives (Chittenden, Kauser, & Panikkos, 2003). Ironically, even

10

Shelters may or may not be legal, but authors did imply legal action in their paper.

16

simplification measures develop into even more complex tax schemes once deductions
and exceptions are considered.
Because of this, studies have established that complexity and vagueness of the
law are good reasons for taxpayer noncompliance (Beck, Davis, & Woon-Oh Jung, 1992;
Erard & Ho, 2001; Feinstein, 1991; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005). Therefore, ways
to simplify the US tax code short of a zero-based approach should be welcome.
One approach critics have offered to simplify the code is the Value Added Tax
(VAT). VAT is a consumption tax collected by retailers. The U.S. House of
Representatives Bill 2511 would impose a national sales tax of 23 percent.12 However,
economic research has shown that a simple sales tax could be less effective than the
current income tax system. A Heritage Foundation report also explains how the
introduction of a VAT tax would “expand the cost of government,” “inadvertently
increase income tax rates,” and “slow economic growth and destroy jobs” (no page)
(Mitchell, 2005). Jones, Thomas, and Lang (2012) argue that implementation and
enforcement of VAT policy would still be complex and costly.
So why is there such an interest in simplifying the code and subsequently the
filing process? Economist over centuries have asserted the need for tax policy to be easy
to understand and easy to pay in order to minimize economic distortion, also known as
deadweight loss (Pressman, 2014). Data analyzed from Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan
(2010) has shown that tax complexity in high income nations has not changed over the

11

The bill was introduced to the House on January 6th, 2015 by Georgia Representative Rob Woodall.
The bill does have exceptions on “intangible property, for property or services purchased for business,
export, or investment purposes, and for state government functions” (information obtained from
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/25)
12
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last two decades13 whereas tax rates have gone down during that same timeframe. They
showed that progressivity of taxes has declined over the selected period, a trend which is
indicative of a flatter tax policy (Peter et al., 2010).
Another way to improve the efficiency of the US Tax Code would be the
reduction of deductions combined with lower tax rates. This would increase the tax base
while reducing the marginal tax rate, a change which should lead to more compliance
(Gordon, 1989). Another regime for achieving economic efficiency is a global cap on all
deductions (Warren, 2014). A global cap on deductions would not eliminate the
expenses, but it would reduce the maximum deduction amounts. By doing this, every
taxpayer would have the same availability of deduction regardless of expenses (Nagin &
Pogarsky, 2001). However, such a global cap would limit those taxpayers with high
levels of individual deductions.
Another literature stream in the personal income tax literature deals with credits.
One of the biggest antipoverty policies for working Americans has been the Earn Income
Tax Credit (EITC) (Athreya, Reilly, & Simpson, 2010; Blumenthal, Erard, & Chih-Chin,
2005; de la Vega, 2013). Much of the EITC literature focuses on how it distorts14 the
economy in terms of income, labor market, and health care. The EITC creates a
distortion because individuals with the same yearly income have to pay distinctly
different effective tax rates (Ordower, 2014). Thus, they would have different after tax
income. Because of the distortion to income and continued compliance malfeasances
(Blumenthal et al., 2005), there are a few noncompliance audit selection studies which
13

They explained that the tax complexity has not changed because adjustments to tax laws are made
continuously in order to avoid bracket creep. They define bracket creep as the lack of inflationary
adjustments to the tax code which push taxpayers into higher income brackets due to an increase in nominal
income.
14
The literature showed that the distortions are both positive and negative.
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use EITC as an indicator for improving IRS personal income tax audit selection (Erard &
Ho, 2002; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005).
Blumenthal et al. (2005) describe some of the characteristics of EITC noncompliance. In their study, they determined that approximately one third of all EITC
filings are from an ineligible EITC filer. Many of these unqualified filers were only able
to pass some of the program’s requirements and improperly claimed EITC in spite of this.
The authors proposed that cheating filers perceived that auditors could portray their
actions as an honest mistake.
In addition to affecting the marginal tax rate of qualifying taxpayers, EITC affects
health care (Arno, Sohler, Viola, & Schechter, 2009; Averett & Wang, 2013; Kenkel &
Schmeiser, 2014; Strully, Rehkopf, & Ziming, 2010). Averett and Wang (2013) argue
that the increase in income, through a reduction in the effective tax rate, leads to an
artificial improvement in the health behaviors of EITC recipients. In addition, research
has shown that the EITC impact the marginal propensity to consume, a tendency which
acts as an economic stimulus (Edwards, 2004). Lastly, the EITC improves labor
participation and unemployment rates due to increased income, which improves
willingness to work and marginal return to labor (Neumark & Wascher, 2011; Scholz,
1994). Overall, the credits, such as EITC, have an impact on the wellbeing of qualifying
taxpayers, but could lead to noncompliance through miss use or interpretation.
Lastly, there is an extensive literature studying the impact of elasticity of taxable
income with respect to a change in tax rates15 (Creedy, 2010; Gordon, 1989; Mosberger,
2011; Saez, Matsaganis, & Tsakloglou, 2012a; Saez, Slemrod, & Giertz, 2012b). Creedy

15

Many of the studies use average or marginal tax rate or net-of-tax rate. The net-of-tax is income after
adjusting for taxes.
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(2010) shows that the level of responsiveness to a change in tax rates (i.e., elasticity) is a
good measure of income tax burden and an indicator of underreporting of taxable income.
Dwenger and Steiner (2012) emphasized that the elasticity is a good measurement of
income tax administration efficiency, but it is not a robust measurement of corporate tax
efficiency. Their study reported that the tax profits did not decline with a decrease in the
corporate tax rate and an inelastic taxable income. Unless the assumption that the market
is efficient is relaxed, this counters usual economic theory.
In conclusion, tax literature is broad and deep. It is also subtly subdivided by
specific taxation literatures, such as the income and corporate tax literatures. The present
literature review provides some understanding of current topics in the general tax
literature associated with this study. The literature stream provided in this section shows
how legal corporate tax planning is linked to tax avoidance. The personal income
literature showed how credits and deduction affects the behavior of individual taxpayers
and how elasticity of income tax can lead to underreporting.
These literature streams are also related to employment tax and the compliance
literature, which is at the core of this study. Specifically, much of the early literature of
tax compliance looked at the impact taxes have on labor market and compliance, which is
a major concern in the employment tax literature. In the next section, the scope of the
literature review will be further narrowed to employment tax. Although the relationships
between income and corporate tax may not be directly linked to the literature of this
study, smaller businesses do try to minimize their tax liability in order to obtain
competitive advantage; they engage in tax avoidance and corporate responsibility

20

(Kubick et al., 2015); and they report net operating loss (NOL) deductions like their
larger counterparts (Planita, 2015).
IV.2 Employment or Trust Tax
The Internal Revenue Code refers to the U.S. Code: Title 26, which is divided
into 11 Subtitles (A to K). There also are rulings and regulations associated with every
subtitle further complicating enforcement, compliance, and filing of taxes. In addition,
Congress continuously changes the code. Given this context, we next review the
literature related to Title 26 U.S. Code Subtitle C (employment taxes).
The employment tax literature is extensive. However, a large portion of the
literature focuses on the legal interpretation and consequences of rulings and law
changes. For the purpose of the present study, legal reviews will be considered to be out
of scope so that we can instead focus on empirical studies. The idea is to understand the
current body of knowledge gained from empirical studies in order to understand the
characteristics of this market segment and to find methods that would be most
appropriate for scientific analysis. Much of the empirical employment tax literature
concentrates on the tax incidence16. The tax incidence is the analysis of who ultimately
has to pay any enacted taxes. This literature has focused predominately on how these
types of taxes affect the labor market and employee wages, and very little tackles the
issue of taxpayer compliance behavior.
IV.2.1 Employment Tax Defined
Employment tax references FUTA, self-employment, social security, and
Medicare tax withheld from income. Employment tax is also referred to as trust tax. It

16

Tax incident is related to elasticity
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takes the name trust because employees’ contributions are held in-trust by the employer
until their contributions are deposited with the IRS (Murthy, 2014). In the literature
review, employment tax is also synonymous with payroll tax and these labels will used
interchangeably throughout the study.
An important definition related to employment tax and this study is the assess
penalty and the duly authorized individual. Publication 15 states that a recovery penalty
of 100 percent may be assessed to the firm (and/or duly authorized individuals) if filings
and deposits do not meet the required obligations and if he/she willfully fails to pay (IRS,
2013; Murthy, 2014). Thus the assess penalty is the interested penalty a firm (or officer)
must pay when it does not meet its tax obligations. A duly authorized individual is
defined as an individual or officer who oversee the collection, accounting, and payment
of employment tax (IRS, 2013). This definition is important since this was the group of
individuals that we solicited to participate in this study. Furthermore, these individuals
are legally responsible for any liability that occurs. Last, there is a dearth of research
attempting to determine why authorized individuals approve illegal tax transactions,
given the possible negative legal and financial implications.
IV.2.2 Employment Tax and the Tax Incidence
In economics, the term-of-art tax incidence17 is used as a framing for who
ultimately is responsible for paying the tax. The general perception is that the individual
consuming the product pays the taxes. However, that is not always the case. In terms of
labor markets, the party with the highest price elasticity of labor will pay a smaller

17

tax incidence is further discussed in the Appendix D
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portion of any employment tax. Past research have shown that this is more commonly
“borne by labour” (pg. 189) (Hamermesh, 1979; Holmlund, 1981; Vroman, 1974).
Given employers are also subject to employment tax matching, employers may
exhibit similar behaviors when facing the tax incident. Empirical evidence suggested that
a sub-segment of small business – self-employed taxpayers – decreased filing compliance
and decreased their payment of employment when employment taxes increased (Heim,
Lurie, & Pearce, 2014).
Beyond the tax incidence and its impact on labor and wages, payroll tax dilemma
occurs when a firm cannot meet its operational liabilities and it uses employment tax
withholdings to pay for these liabilities (Godfrey, 2004; Mauldin & Wilder, 1997).
Companies normally face a liquidity crisis during economic downturns or economic
distress, such as the great recession (Grady, 2013). Grady (2013) indicates that many of
these businesses continue to illegally borrow from withheld taxes for expanded periods of
time, and found that the majority of those businesses will eventually fail. Bloomquist
(2003a) also argues that a financial strain is one of the determinants of noncompliance for
all taxpayers. One of the arguments of this study is that some of the authorized
individual will succumb to the payroll tax dilemma when confronting a liquidity crisis (or
strain).
A different argument from the payroll dilemma is that individuals decide to use
employment tax withholding as a short-term loan without clearly understanding the
negative financial implications. Another explanation is that they are simply taking a high
interest loan from the federal government. As these business owners may see it, they
prefer paying their supplier and staying in business than paying the IRS and go out of
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business. There are cases where taxpayers consciously (or unconsciously) make late
payment. Given the IRS is unable to identify these individuals until quarter’s end, the
withholdings could be used to pay other responsibilities. Then, the employers make
withholding deposits at the end of the quarter, putting them back to legal standing with
their federal tax withholding deposits for employment tax and extending their accounts
payables.
Yet another explanation for this phenomenon could be derived from individual’s
perception of the outcome. This perception could be rooted in self-positivity bias where
the individual expects a positive outcome or image (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, &
Hankin, 2004) or underestimating risks (Dengfeng & Sengupta, 2013). In other words,
these business owners are unable to see how their decision will lead them or their
business to failure in the long run.
IV.3 Compliance
Like taxes, the issue of tax compliance is as old as the Egyptians (Erard, 1997).
However, the in-depth study of tax compliance began around the late 1960s. Compliance
can be defined as conforming or complying with a process. Roth, Scholz, and Witte
(1989) define tax compliance as the complete, timely and accurate filing of tax returns.
Compliance, or lack thereof, is the raison d’être for the IRS. Taxpayer compliance can be
sub categorized into three areas: payment, filling, and reporting compliance (Brown &
Mazur, 2003). According to Brown and Mazur (2003) these types are exclusive and
exhaustive.
So how does the IRS define and enforce compliance? The definition of
compliance or tax evasion can be derived from the Second District Court of Appeals and
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eventual Supreme Court decision of Gregory v. Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In their
decisions, the courts stated that individuals are not bounded under any patriotic duty to
pay the Treasure or the IRS anything other than what is legally due.18 Thus, under the
accounting principle of substance over form derived from the Supreme Court ruling,
compliance is met as long as the information is complete and acceptable under the tax
code. Otherwise, the act is noncompliant whether the act is deliberate or accidental.
In general, the IRS measures reporting compliance using the National Research
Program (NRP).19 NRP is a stratified random sample of approximately 50,00020
intensively audited federal income tax returns (Erard, 2002). From this data, the IRS
develops internal algorithms for case scoring (known as DIF scores) and case selection
(Andreoni et al., 1998). The IRS uses the following procedure to select potential highrisk noncompliant cases and to enforce compliance:
“The Unreported Income DIF (UIDIF) score rates the return for the potential of
unreported income. IRS personnel screen the highest-scoring returns, selecting
some for audit and identifying the items on these returns that are most likely to
need review” (no page number) (IRS, 2006).
It is clear that improving DIF scores will lead to improve case selection and
eventual voluntary compliance. Currently, the compliance in the US is estimated to be
83.1 percent (IRS, 2012a) and probability of an audit is relatively low (IRS, 2014a).
Kalambokidis, Turk, and Blumenthal (2012) showed that approximately 10 percent of
18

The Supreme Court states: “The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would
be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law,” The Second District Court of Appeals
states: “Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes” (69 F.2d 811).
19
The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) is the predecessor of the NRP program.
20
Number obtained from http://www.irs.gov/uac/National-Research-Program-(NRP).
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subjects in an experiment would be fully non-compliant. Even though the majority of
individuals will do the right thing, a consistent reduction in audit rates can erode the longterm voluntary compliance rates. To avoid the potential erosion of voluntary compliance
and maintain the high level of voluntary compliance, some researchers propose
increasing the use of record matching, such as the W-2s and the Information Reporting
and Document Matching (IRDM) (Andreoni et al., 1998; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider,
2005; Scholz, 2003).
Record matching strategies has proven to be a useful to alleviate the tax evasion.
For example, over 97 percent of wage earners are compliant (Clotfelter, 1983; MartinezVazquez & Rider, 2005; Slemrod, 1985). This segment of the taxpaying population has a
very high level of record matching. In addition, 90 percent of investment income is
compliant (Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005; Slemrod, 1985) and this number is likely to
increase with the introduction of the Form 1099-K in 2009. Again, this high level of
compliance behavior can be attributed to a high level of record match. On the other hand
47 percent of small business and partnerships are compliant (Slemrod, 1985), and this
low compliance rate is in part attributed to the low level of record matching. Some
studies have shown that out of all business entities studied, partnerships are more
complaint because it would require collusion from all the partners to underreport
(Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005).
This issue is not exclusive to type of taxpayer or form utilized to report.
Noncompliance is also more evident in individual line items reported within certain form.
For example, the majority of Form 1040 line items have some method of record
matching. The one exception is cash contributions and this area exhibits a higher rate of

26

noncompliance (Blumenthal, Kalambokidis, & Turk, 2012; Turk, Muzikir, Blumenthal,
& Kalambokidis, 2007).
In addition to of record matching, IRS Commissioner Koskinen (2015) expressed
concern in a key note address at the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center about the
potential erosion of voluntary compliance because of the impact of budgetary cuts on
detection and enforcement. His concern is possibly due in part to empirical evidence,
which has shown that increased probability of detection of noncompliance and
enforcement will reduce the intentional and accidental noncompliance rates (Alm,
Jackson, & McKee, 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992;
Hasseldine, Hite, & Toumi, 2007). Indeed, Joulfaian and Rider (1998) calculated a seven
percent compliance improvement when the probability of audit increased ten percent. In
addition, studies have shown that there is a lag effect on compliance when the audit rate
decreases (White & Woodbury, 1985). In addition Alm and Yunus (2009) have found
that the presence of a continual tax audit (termed “persistence”) has a short and long term
effect on compliance behavior. The sections below will provide a more focused review
on filing and reporting compliance and payment compliance.
IV.3.1 Filing and Reporting Compliance
In general, taxpayers will report their incomes, expenses, credits, and deductions.
Expenses, credits, and deductions will reduce taxpayers’ taxable income while
compensations will increase them. Filing compliance is the complete, timely, and
accurate submission of forms to authorities and the amounts disclosed to authorities on
filed tax forms are considered reported amounts. Therefore, reporting and filing
compliance is the complete, timely, and accurate disclosure of tax information on all
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sources of compensation. Underreporting, or reporting noncompliance, is the difference
between reported amount and actual amounts incurred during the year. It is simply the
understated amount of tax liability owed at the time of filing (Plumley, 2006). Reporting
noncompliance may be a product of overstating expenses, credits, and deductions or the
understating of incomes.
One of the cornerstone of tax compliance literature is the simple model of rational
crime theorized by Becker (1968). Becker’s (1968) crime and punishment optimization
model illustrates how the cost of the crime, the cost of the apprehension and conviction,
and the number of offences work as determining factors for crime deterrence. This
model is based on expected utility theory. Expected utility provides a model that
explains attitudes toward risk. In this case, it is a model that explains attitudes towards
the risk of an audit.
This model shows that as the social cost increases, deterrence increases. Thus, a
higher number of offenses lead to a higher probability for deterrence because of the cost
associated or incurred by each offence. On the other hand, if individuals are not punished
for their offences, the cost of noncompliance decreases. This motivates taxpayers using
“tax rate, detection probability, and penalty structure” (pg. 2) to reassess compliance
behavior and potentially become less compliant (Fischer et al., 1992).
Conversely, the higher the cost of apprehension and conviction (or our synonym
punishment) lead to a lower probability of deterrence. This negative correlation assumes,
quite rightly, that detection is not perfect. This is due to the fact that the social cost of
committing a crime can, at times, be less costly than the cost of punishing the perpetrator
(i.e., cost of crime < cost of punishment) and must take in to account the fact that the
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majority of noncompliant are marginally noncompliant making enforcement less
advantageous for authorities. Therefore, authorities, such as the IRS, should at a
minimum attempt to optimize enforcement where the cost of the crime is at least equal to
the cost of punishment. Preferably, they should optimize enforcement by maximizing the
dollars generated per hour of enforcement from each audit class.
The IRS could pursue this optimization via a model such as the one developed by
Becker. However if detection and punishment were the only predictors of compliance,
noncompliance would be much lower (Alm, 1991). Fischer et al. (1992) provide four
categories that more completely measure of compliance and emphasize how detection
probability is at the core of all the models. These categories of detection probability
are:21





Demographic: “age, gender” (pg. 2)
Socioeconomic: “education, income level, income source, and occupation” (pg.
2)
Normative Beliefs and Subjective Norms: “ethics, perceived fairness of the tax
system, peer influence” (pg. 2)
Tax law: “complexity of the tax system, IRS contact, sanctions, detection
probability, and tax rates” (pg. 2)
The second cornerstone of the tax compliance literature was advanced by

Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which was later refined in Yitzhaki (1974). As with
Becker, this model is also based on expected utility theory. Allingham and Sandmo
argued that rational individuals, when facing multistage situation, will analyze their filing
decision using outcomes from prior filing and expected future cost of apprehension.
Their model identified a positive relationship between the magnitude of a tax penalty and
tax compliance. In other words, higher penalties will lead to higher compliance.
21

All variables mentioned in the categories are provided by the Fischer et al. paper. Other papers state that
there are 14 variables, but none mentions which ones they are.
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The Allingham & Sandmo model breaks down the decision process into several
steps. First, taxpayers must decide how much to report, and that decision is followed by
the decision to pay (Erard & Ho, 2001). Their original model was:
22

Where E(U) is the expected utility; p is the probability of detection (or audit); W
is income; X is reported income; Θ is the tax rate; and π is the penalty rate. If W is
greater than X, there is a tax gap. Simply, the right side of the equation provided a
formula of the gains

and the cost

associated with the final reporting decision. As mentioned above and using Formula,
when the probability of detection (p) or penalty (Θ) increases, reporting improves
because the cost increases beyond the gains from underreporting.
Using this model, Clotfelter (1983), Gordon (1989), Alm et al. (1992), and
Andreoni et al. (1998) argued that an increase in the tax rate will increase noncompliance
when the probability of getting apprehended remains constant. For example, the
Andreoni et al. line of reasoning showed that the after-tax income benefits increase as a
result of underreporting while the expected cost of apprehension (i.e., audit) remain
constant. If the tax policy’s goal is to minimize tax evasion, any increase in taxes should
be accompanied by an increase in tax enforcement or an increase in penalties to restrain
any changes to the compliance rate. The result expressed by Andreoni et al. is similar to
those observed with other assets or normal goods (Stiglitz, 1969) and what is expected
using expected utility maximization under uncertainty (Alm et al., 1992; Clotfelter, 1983;
Lee, 2001; Stiglitz, 1969). This notion is consistent throughout the entire literature.
22

There many more refinements of this model in the paper and in the literature, but investigator will use
this model for simplicity. However, another simple model could have been used: the multistage model
where is the gain and is the cost associated with being discovered.
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Using the Allingham and Sandmo model, Lee (2001) asseverates that rational
individuals will purposely become noncompliant and will self-insure in the event of an
audit. He argues that rational individuals are willing to engage in tax evasion when the
probability of detection is low (Lee, 2001) and he suggests that noncompliant taxpayers
will use some of the proceeds from not paying taxes as a self-insurance policy in the
event of an audit. This strategy becomes viable provided the proceeds from
underreporting exceed the cost of audits over an extended period. On the other hand, if
the audit rate increases, the scheme becomes less lucrative and the self-insured tax
evaders will increase their compliance behavior.
In addition to tax rate and penalties, Allingham and Sandmo’s model also
explored the issue of asymmetry of information (taxpayers have more information about
their transactions than the enforcing authority). They formulate a relationship between
the uncertainty associated with tax declarations and asymmetric information. Their
premise was that the presence of asymmetric information increases the level of
uncertainty. This effect is more prevalent with the absence of third party matching.
Their model showed how higher uncertainty coupled with the fact that underreporting by
the taxpayer does not automatically trigger a reporting penalty or an audit will inevitably
lead to underreporting.
Their model was able to measure the relationship between higher detection and
improved income reporting, but was not able to find the relationship between income and
reporting (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Alm et al., 1992). In addition, the Alm et al.
(1992) study showed that due to the lack of reliable information on individual compliance
choices and the presence of asymmetric information in any tax transaction may lead
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taxpayers to take on riskier behaviors. This finding is aligned with other studies
discussed above and the results could be rooted in an individual’s perception of the
likelihood of sanction (i.e., probability of detection). The Andreoni et al. (1998) and Lee
(2001) studies indicate that detection and punishment are not the only predictors of
compliant behavior. Alm (1991) explained that if detection and punishment were the
only predictors of noncompliance, noncompliance should have increased in the US for all
sources of income without third party matching. Furthermore, he explains that studies
have shown taxpayers in many circumstances have failed to maximize their expected
utilities. Given these shortcomings in the models (both Becker’s and later Allingham and
Sandmo’s model), researchers have undertaken numerous studies to understand and
explain the sources and characteristics of noncompliance. The next two subsections
discuss the topics of sources and characteristics of noncompliance, which should provide
a clear understanding of the discrepancies and inconsistencies observed in tax compliance
behavior.
IV.3.1.1 Sources of Compliance (or Noncompliance)
There are different sources of tax compliance. Some of these differences are very
subtle, and in other cases, the literature has not reached a consensus because of
contradictory results. For example, game theory and principle agent models have shown
that taxpayers’ perceptions regarding the probability of detection are relatively accurate.
Whereas, Scholz (2003) argued that the taxpayers’ have “inaccurate beliefs about” (pg.
186) the probability of detection, and Alm et al. (1992) explained that in most case
taxpayers will over estimate audit rate. Furthermore, those individuals who have a riskseeking personality will modify their probability of detection perception more
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significantly than those who are risk-adverse (Schulz, 2014). Nevertheless, Andreoni et
al. (1998) suggested that taxpayers are unable to determine the sources that triggered the
audits or the magnitude of the penalties related to noncompliance. Moreover, individual
with different risk aversion levels will modify their probability of detection after
experiencing tax filing results or audits. This is the notion of persistence.
In addition, compliance may be impacted by the presence of a refund or an
amount owed. Robben et al. (1990) suggested that taxpayers who are receiving a refund
are more risk adverse because they are already owed money back and would be subject to
a loss if cheating were identified. On the other hand, those who owe money have the
lower perceived risk of noncompliance because they have already incurred a loss. If not
apprehended, the losses are minimized.
Another source of noncompliance is asymmetry of information. Studies
mentioned above have claim that individuals have asymmetry information and that the
cost of punishment has an impact on compliance. However, up to this point, they have
not explained what some of the sources of underreporting are. In most cases, firms and
individuals will underreport their source of income wherever taxpayers perceive the
sources are harder for authorities to identify (Johns & Slemrod, 2010). For example, the
IRS reports that most of its tax gap underreporting is income understating instead of the
overstating deductions or credits (Erard, 2002; Johns & Slemrod, 2010; Winchester,
2009). Studies have shown that income underreporting is subtle, and can materialize in
different forms.
For example, Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991) explained that introduction of
penalties and changes in audit probability impacts behavior. This is consistent with other
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studies, but they determined that the changes are dependent on risk aversion. Alm et al.
(1992) study also showed that the frequency of audit also has a positive impact on
taxpayer compliance, and that reward could encourage compliance. In Robben’s et al.
(1990) study, businesses that were expecting a refund (a reward) in excess of $1,000 were
compliant 95 percent of the time. Whereby, businesses with balance due of $1,000 were
compliant 70 percent of the time. The same study showed that individual taxpayer
compliance rate was 96 percent and 89 percent respectively. This example is called a
“balance due effect” (pg. 684) (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998), and it implies that the tax
liability threshold have an impact on taxpayers’ decision to underreport.
Another source of underreporting was associated with the complexity of the
return or high filing burden. Individual filling with additional schedules (especially
Schedule C, D, and F) and forms were more likely to underreport (Blumenthal et al.,
2005; Clotfelter, 1983; Feinstein, 1991). One explanation may be a consequence of
increased burden. The burden on compliance has been estimated at $100 billion dollars.
Burden is calculated using the IRS Individual Burden Model, which accounts in dollars
the hours and moneys spent on completing and filing tax forms. Assuming the taxpayers
are willing to self-insure, as Lee explained, and they use a model similar to Allingham
and Sandmo’s model, it would not be hard to conclude that noncompliance in a highly
complex return is a practical solution. Clotfelter also propose that different taxpayer
segments will underreport differently. For example a wage earner, whose income is
matched, will over state deduction and credits. On the other hand, businesses are more
likely to underreport by boosting their operating expenses.
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Similar to Robben et al. and Clotfelter, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) found
that increase enforcement is an effective way of increasing overall compliance.
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) study showed that the increased enforcement on a
mode23 will increase income compliance, but it will have adverse effect on the untreated
modes. Their study illustrated how 46 percent of returns understated income and about
half of these had overstated deduction, which was in accordance with other studies.
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider argued that taxpayers will determine which modes
authorities are focusing their enforcement (i.e., understating income or overstating
deductions) to reassess their probability of detection. They argue this is an application of
a substitution effect. Once filing results are reassessed, taxpayers switch from
underreporting income to over reporting deduction or vice versa. Therefore, gains in
compliance are driven exclusively by graters gains in the targeted mode, which have a
larger dollar impact than the loses from the mode not targeted.
In addition, they argue that taxpayers’ decision to be noncompliant is driven in
part by the presence of third party verification, which is in line with other studies
presented in this paper. Blumenthal et al. (1998) also found that income level has an
impact on reporting when there is enforcement and recode matching. They found that
lower income taxpayers were more likely to increase the income reporting after being
informed of an impending audit. On the other hand, higher income filer reduced the tax
income reporting after being informed of an impending audit. Blumenthal et al. (1998)
and Erard (1993) argue that this may be due to the hiring of tax professionals, which
prefer more aggressive reporting activities.
23

These tax modes are defined as different methods of filing, overstate, correctly state and understate
income and deductions. The modes used in the Martinez-Vazquez and Rider are income and deduction
reporting compliance.
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With respect to business compliance, this too is a source of noncompliance.
Although, there has been relatively little research completed exclusively on business
noncompliance (Alm, 1991), the presence of self-employment income indicates higher
probability of noncompliance. Newer studies do provide some insight on this segment’s
compliance behavior. For example, sole proprietors have shown to underreport
employment taxes liability as well as their income (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998; Kukk &
Staehr, 2013; Pissarides & Weber, 1989) and the type of industry also has an impact on
the compliance level (Nor, Ahmad, & Saleh, 2010).
More persuasive evidence that self-employed business are a source of
noncompliance is that the reporting compliance for this group is substantially lower than
those of wage earning tax payers. Their voluntary compliance is between 40 and 80
percent depending on the income source,24 and much lower than wage earners. One of
the study showing the voluntary compliance of employment tax around 50 percent lower
than personal income (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998). While the manifestation of
underreporting income falls in line with the rest of the filing population (Blumenthal et
al., 2005; Erard & Ho, 2001), the magnitude of underreporting is greater for small
business and sole proprietors (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998; Slemrod, 1985).
As with individual tax filing, the complexity of the code has an impact on small
business and self-employment filings compliance. Smalls businesses use tax preparers
because of the complexity of the code. Erard (1993) found that tax professionals,
especially CPA and tax lawyers, are “more likely to approve of aggressive reporting
activities” (pg. 167), which are more likely to end up audited and noncompliant. Also,
Erard (1997) argues that taxpayers’ perceived probability of detection is diminished
24

Sources could rent farm and self-employment income.
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when employing a tax preparer to complete and file their tax returns. He argues the
hiring of tax professionals further increasing their chances of noncompliance of business
and self-employment tax. Ironically, he proposed that voluntary compliance would
increase if taxpayers would complete their own tax forms. His reasoning is that the
results showed self-prepared returns are more compliant in subsequent years after an
audit. Whereas, returns completed by tax professionals were less compliant in
subsequent years after an audit.
Given that individual filings include some employment tax requirements through
the filing of Schedule C or Schedule F, some studies have shown that these forms are an
indicator of underreporting of employment tax and general noncompliance (Erard, 1997;
Joulfaian & Rider, 1998). A recurring reason for the underreporting has been linked to
the lack record matching in the past. Interestingly, sole proprietors and farmers, both of
which are considered small business by the IRS, were exempt from record matching
(Andreoni et al., 1998). This exemption implied that the probability of detection was
lower. Ceteris paribus, the changes in the code and improved technological capabilities
for these taxpayers 25 should lead to improved detection of noncompliance and eventually
improve compliance rate for this population.
Another important small business self-employment finding relates to the balance
due effect. The balance due effect is the amount that taxpayers has not paid by April 15
on his/her tax liability. This finding is important because how much a taxpayer owes on
April 15 is an indication of noncompliance. Meaning, the greater the balance due amount

25

The 2009 changes to Sections 6041, 6041A, 6050W, and 6051 requires third party payment settlement
organizations to report payment transactions to the IRS for the purpose of record matching, and
employment and income tax enforcement.
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the more likely they are to underreporting and become noncompliant (Joulfaian & Rider,
1998).
Finally, noncompliance detection is dependent on systematic and unsystematic
components and the results of audits are imperfect (Feinstein, 1991). All the variables
discussed above could be considered systematic components. They are generalization of
the population. On the other hand, unsystematic components are dependent on both the
individual behavior of the taxpayer and the knowledge of the IRS’ examiner. Feinstein
(1991) correctly explain that the revenue agents have different grades and different
capabilities between grades and the nature of the return they examine may be
substantially different.26 All these differences in returns and examiner level will lead to
different probability of detection. The model developed by Feinstein is useful when
developing a partial detection model because it takes into account complexity of the
return and the ability of the examiner when assessing probability of detection. It is also
useful IRS policy because the author explains that training and better employment
screening would lead to better probability of detection. This is an issue the Service
continues to have two decades after the publication of Feinstein’s paper.
IV.3.1.2 Characteristics of Noncompliant Taxpayers
In the literature, there are two groups on noncompliant taxpayers: those who file
and underreport and those who do not file. First, review of the characteristics of
underreporters will be provided and then provide a brief overview the non-filers.27
Collins and Plumlee (1991) and Feinstein (1991) studies provide evidence that
underreporting increased as income level, effort or marginal cost increases. In addition,
26

For example, one case may have a simple Form 1040. At the other end of the complexity scale, a case
may have a Form 1040 plus several schedules, including schedule K-1 flow-through.
27
A more in-depth discussion of non-filers is available in Appendix D.
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studies have found that age, more specifically students and working adults, have a
different “tax mentality” (pg. 20), implying different taxpayer behavior and sophistication
(Beck et al., 1991; Blumenthal et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 1992). Lastly, many of the
studies have found that prior filing is a good indication of future filing behavior (Erard &
Ho, 2001).
Beck et al. (1991) also provide evidence that risk neutral individuals will increase
their reported income “when penalty rates, audit probabilities” (pg. 536) and uncertainty
increase. Their model also showed that risk neutral taxpayers behave the same way28 as
risk adverse taxpayers. In addition, they determined that the risk-neutral model is more
robust than prior risk preference models. Furthermore, other studies have shown that
filing status could be a predictor of noncompliance. More specifically, studies have
shown that married individuals are more likely to underreport (Andreoni et al., 1998;
Clotfelter, 1983).
With respect to employment tax, very little is mentioned in the literature about the
characteristics of noncompliance. However, there is sufficient information about owners
of small businesses to assess their compliance behavior. However to do so, selfemployee compliance characteristics will be used as proxy to understand employment tax
filing behavior because of the similarity in the population segment. Feinstein (1991)
found that taxpayers’ filing with Schedule C (Self-employed) and Schedule F (Farming)
are more likely to be noncompliant that other taxpayers. With respect to farmers, he
found that much of the underreporting occurs with income item (adjusted gross income).
Further complicating matters and increasing the probability of noncompliance, Erard

28

Investigator used the word the same because there was no statistical difference between groups. Beck et
al. used “marginally significant” when the p-value was .077.
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(1997) found that many returns with schedules such as schedule C, D, E, F and K-1 will
disproportionately use tax preparers and increasing the probability of noncompliance.
Joulfaian and Rider (1998) also found that by including employment tax (i.e. Schedule C
and Schedule F) the probability of noncompliance increases with an increase in the tax
rate. Also if an individual has evaded taxes in the past without any enforcement
response, there will be an “element of persistence” (pg.101) in the taxpayer’s compliance
behavior (Alm & Yunus, 2009).
Now that some characteristics of underreporters have been discussed, a brief
overview of non-filers is essential because their presence (or lack thereof) increase biases
on the outcome. This subgroup of taxpayers also creates the appearance lower fraudulent
levels, and understanding their behaviors improves our understanding of compliance
(Feinstein, 1991). Erard and Ho’s (2001) explained that certain characteristics, such as
hard to find, youth, married and blue collar, are traits of non-filers. Inevitably,
complexity of filing and business income are at the core of non-filers compliance.
IV.3.1.3 Audit Regimes and Compliance
An audit is a “review/examination of an organization's or individual's accounts
and financial information to ensure information is being reported correctly, according to
the tax laws, to verify the amount of tax reported is substantially correct” (no page) (IRS,
2015). According to the IRS (2015), there are three ways and individual or organization
may be selected for and audit: random, document matching, and related examinations.
Audits could take place in person or simply a review of records. There are three results
from an audit: no change, change with agreement, and change with disagreement.
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The experimental design literature shows that this is a key variable in any
compliance model for both the filer and the authorities (Alm et al., 1992). The
probability of detection is analogous to the probability of an audit. Many studies in this
literature have shown that individuals will alter their reporting and paying behavior based
on probability of audit, and the severity and celerity of enforcement. As a matter of a
fact, the impact of an audit that results in an amount change is six times larger because
audited taxpayers will interact with other taxpayers and it will cause other taxpayers to
voluntarily comply (Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 2004). While this is a great signal to
taxpayer by authorities, the audit rate in the United States had decrease from six percent
to about one percent over the last four decades, but it depends on different criteria. The
budgetary results associated with this reduction to the audit rates have been calculated to
be approximately seven billion dollars (Alm et al., 2004).
Before providing further information on the relationship between audit and
compliance, a definition of audit is in order. Collins and Plumlee (1991) study is one of
the first studies to define alternative audit rules, and they have categorized them into
three distinct rules:


Random audit



Cut-off audit



Conditional (or strategic) audit

A random audit rule is when all taxpayers have the same probability of being
selected (Collins & Plumlee, 1991). Cut-off audit rule establishes in advance a dollar
threshold that triggers an audit. So any time a taxpayer reports an amount below the
established threshold, an audit will be conducted (Andreoni et al., 1998). Conditional

41

rules use selection criteria and population segmentation to modify the probability of
detection, and it uses the taxpayer’s reported information for case selection (Clark,
Friesen, & Muller, 2004). Selection criteria could be line items such as filing status,
number of dependents or reported amounts, and population segmentations are “pools”29
that can be created using prior audit results or case type (e.g., different forms – 1040-EZ,
1040 with additional schedules, and 1040 with partnership income).
As mentioned in the tax literature, the best way to accurately determine taxpayer
compliance would be to use random audits. However, random audits are too costly.
Thus, it could not be operationalized. The cut-off rule has shown to be useful, but only
when taxpayers are risk neutral. Therefore, the cut-off audit is not viable as and
optimization strategy because it is too restrictive to operationalize. Lastly, conditional
“are designed to achieve regulatory compliance with fewer inspections than required by
random auditing” (pg. 60) (Clark et al., 2004) and the impact of conditional audits
decreases underreporting as income increases (Beck et al., 1992; Collins & Plumlee,
1991).
Another positive implication of audits is the existence of a lag effect, which
makes taxpayers compliant over several perriods (White & Woodbury, 1985). On the
other hand, the impacts of audits are not estimated to last over a long period of time
(Andreoni et al., 1998), but they do persist (Alm & Yunus, 2009). They are short-term
event. So in terms of tax policy, using simple but frequent record matching audits that
would signal ‘surveillance’ to average taxpayers may be a good policy for the IRS to

29

As defined in Clark et. Al (2004) (pg. 70)
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incorporate as part of their compliance efforts30 and would minimize persistence of tax
evasion.
In essence, the IRS audit strategies are similar to conditional (or strategic) audit
rule used to determine the probability of detection and appear to be the best plausible
option available for the authorities. On the other hand, Alm et al. (1992) warns that audit
levels similar to those employed by the IRS have a low impact on reporting compliance
in the long-run. This low audit rate combined with short term behavioral effects of audits
suggest that enforcement has to be continual (again addressing the importance of
frequency), especially for those individual who are risk loving or have not been audited
for some time. Nevertheless, conditional tax audit appear to be the most successful audit
regime.
Lastly, Beck et al. (1992) provide some insights on the important of implicit and
explicit costs of an audit. Even when no change is the result of an audit, taxpayers have
to incur implicit and explicit costs. These costs may include the hiring of a tax
professional, increased hours in preparation and increase stress. Beck et al. (1992) claim
that this increased cost due to an audit, which cannot easily be tested in and experimental
setting, will increases the risk aversion of taxpayers. They expect these costs to be a
source for less aggressive compliance behavior than those observed in their experiments.
IV.3.2 Payment Compliance
Filing compliance means the complete, timely, and accurate filing of taxes. If
taxes are accurately filed, then payment compliance implies no underpayment and a
timely payment. On the other hand, the literature has provided countless evidence to the
30

This suggestion would be similar to the current IRS Automated Underreporter (AUR) and
Correspondence Examinations.
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existance of such examples are the balance due effect and the payroll tax dilemma. In the
section below, a review of the payment literature is presented though it is important to
stress that much of the payment compliance literature is linked to the general tax
compliance literature and the models covered above. In addition, most of the literature
focuses on filing and not exclusively on the payment of taxes. Many times, payment
compliance appears to be a secondary element in studies rather than a primary research
focus.
Nevertheless, the concept of payment compliance is important because it is
essential to the notion of equity and efficiency. As some of the studies mentioned
(Andreoni et al., 1998; Erard, 1997; Erard & Ho, 2001; Fischer et al., 1992; Gordon,
1989), the perceived fairness of the tax code will affect compliance in general. Without
ensuring that all (or almost) taxpayers pay their legally incurred tax liabilities, a sense of
inequity and inefficiency becomes pervasive in the consciousness of the tax base. In
1988, 40 percent of households underpaid their tax liabilities according to a tax gap
analysis (Andreoni et al., 1998). This statistic along with the assertion that slightly over
90 percent of households voluntarily report their taxes (itself a low rate, we would argue)
shows a disconnect between people’s perception of filing compliance and payment
compliance.
The payment of taxes on earned income is a requirement and taxpayers must
make payments by year’s end (IRS, 2014b). However, many individuals make ongoing
payments using withholding or estimated tax payments in order to avoid potential
penalties and interest. Therefore, taxpayers make calculated assessments of their
expected withholdings and estimated tax payments on their income as the tax year
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progress in order to avoid the penalties and interest. As part of this calculated
assessment, taxpayers also seek to minimize the risk of providing an interest free loan to
the government (i.e. federal and state). In doing so, taxpayers may underreport income
and may underpay on the actual tax liability accumulated.
In the Feltham and Paquette (2002) study, the authors argue that individuals who
do not adequately report and pay their tax withholdings or estimated tax payments were
more likely to underreport. This idea is central to the current study because it could be
anticipated that employers will underreport their employment tax liability whenever they
are faced with a liquidity problem. This underreporting behavior should eventually
morph into a behavior of persistent underpayment given the presence of uncertainty of an
audit and perceived behavior control.
In concussion, studies have shown that individuals will comply with payments
when enforcement is increased (Alm et al., 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Hasseldine et al.,
2007). We also know from the literature mentioned above (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
Andreoni et al., 1998; Becker, 1968; Clotfelter, 1983; Fischer et al., 1992; Lee, 2001) that
authorities make calculated assessment to determine the benefits associated with the
prosecution of crimes. On the other hand, the literature (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
Andreoni et al., 1998; Becker, 1968; Fischer et al., 1992) also mentions that individuals
make similar assessment to determine the benefits associated with reporting and payment
compliance. Both of these calculations are formulated, in essence, by using asymmetric
information and probability of uncertainty.
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IV.3.3 Income Shock
Berloffa and Modena (2013) define negative income shock as the loss of revenues
over a period. Hryshko (2014) suggest that households are only able to adjust to a
negative income shock as long as the reduction of income is between 8 to 25 percent.
Carroll (2009) further explains the difference between transitory and permanent income
shock, where transitory income shock relates to short-term changes in income and
permanent income shock relates to long-term income shock. In this study, the income
shock was identified a transitory and it consists of a 16.5 percent reduction in revenue.
The percentage selected is the median of the range provided by Hryshko (2014).
IV.4 Literature Review Summary
In conclusion, taxpayer compliance, like many other human behaviors, can take
on subtle differences. Research has shown that marginal tax rate, probability of
detection, and penalties will have all an impact on compliance. Additionally, social
characteristics of the taxpayer will affect compliance. Some of these social
characteristics are marital status and age. Furthermore, studies have found some
economic characteristics that are associated with noncompliance. Most of these
characteristics deal with the filing of self-employment or business tax.
In addition, there is consensus in the literature that compliance is also driven by
the level of satisfaction with the government and the perceived fairness of the tax system.
If individuals believe the government is properly working and everyone is paying their
fair share of taxes, compliance increases. Lastly, the complexity of the tax system and
the presence of third party reporting have an impact on the filing compliance. In other
words, complexity introduces ambiguity. This ambiguity leads to overstating deductions
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and credits and underreporting income. The lack of third party reporting makes it harder
for an authority to verify and because of this asymmetry of information, taxpayers
comply less often.
With respect to audit methods, the consensus is that conditional audit rules are the
most effective way to address noncompliant taxpayer and to increase enforcement. These
audit methods are similar to those used by the IRS. Even though the literature recognizes
conditional audit rules as the best option, all the experimental studies reviewed in this
section have used a random audit design. Moreover, many of these studies have random
audit rates that are operationally unrealistic because of high levels of audit rates. None of
the studies have addressed or recommended a standard to correctly address this issue and
the tax compliance literature has identified this is as a limitation of prior experimental
designs. Joulfaian and Rider (1998) have calculated the predicted probability of an audit
to be between 4.3 and 5.7 percent. This range accounts for different conditional audit
rule of income tax, but does not account for employment tax audit rates. Furthermore,
these rates vary because of the IRS usage of discriminant functions analysis for the
selection of cases (Beck et al., 1992), and this is a reason for why taxpayers are unsure
about the probability of detection.
With respect to research methods, there is consensus in the literature that
econometric models have been useful in identifying characteristics of noncompliance.
There is also a consensus that experimental design can be used to better understand the
subtle differences that complex econometric models are unable to identify due to
redundancy (or multicollinearity).
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V

THEORY

V.1 Theoretical Motivation
The theoretical motivation of this study is to enhance our understanding of
taxpayers’ antisocial behavior using General Deterrence Theory. Deterrence is the
impact that punishment has on those who have not committed a criminal act (Blumstein,
Cohen, & Nagin, 1978). In terms of tax enforcement, deterrence is the impact tax audits
and their accompanying punishments, such as interest, penalties, and imprisonment, have
on those individuals who have failed to report and pay taxes their tax requirements.
General Deterrence Theory has been used in different fields such as: criminal justice
(Lawes, 1927; Schelling, 1958; Tittle, Botchkovar, & Antonaccio, 2011), international
relations (Kalplowitz, 1973; Quackenbush, 2010, 2011b), economics (Homburg, Fürst,
Ehrmann, & Scheinker, 2013; Rhee, 2012), and information systems (Chen,
Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; Lijiao, Wenli,
Qingguo, & Smyth, 2014; Straub & Welke, 1998). The theory is based on the general
idea of homo economicus – people are rational and they respond to incentives (Blumstein
et al., 1978).
Using this basic economic principle, it would be safe to assume that rational
individuals will partake in certain tax behaviors if the marginal benefit is equal or greater
than the marginal cost. Consequently, tax decisions are determined at the margins
(Phillips, 2014). The simple model of rational crime (SMORC) states that there are two
methods to increase individuals’ marginal cost: (1) higher probability of being
apprehended and (2) increased magnitude of punishment (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972;
Ariely, 2012; Upadhyay, 2013). Furthermore, studies have shown that individuals will
improve their compliance rate when enforcement is increased or the enforcement of
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punishment is creditable (Alm et al., 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Hasseldine et al., 2007;
Kalplowitz, 1973; Lijiao et al., 2014). Individuals, firms, and authorities will undertake a
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether they should misbehave or prosecute,
respectively (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Rhee, 2012). In addition, asymmetric
information will play a part in the final analysis (Alm et al., 1992; Ariely, 2012; Mazar &
Ariely, 2006; Vitell, 2003) and noncompliance will increase if transaction visibility
decreases (Andreoni et al., 1998; Bloomquist, 2003b; Roth et al., 1989).
General Deterrence Theory provides an explanation as to how different levels of
punishment influence antisocial behavior. Its economic foundation is based on
optimization of expected utility, which is one of the most common theories used to
explain tax compliance behavior. In general, the measurement of deterrence can be
achieved by calculating the change in criminal rates at different levels of punishment
(Blumstein et al., 1978). The current study will test the change in payment behavior
when different levels of certainty (i.e., probability of detection) are imposed.
V.2 General Deterrence Theory
V.2.1 Background
In the older compliance literature, most of the theoretical focus was on economic
theory centered on labor and utility theory. The newer papers refer to decision-making
and maximization of expected utility function under uncertainty and risk aversion (Alm,
1991; Alm & Yunus, 2009; Lee, 2001; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005). Most of the
studies on tax compliance refer to the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model which is
based on expected utility derived from a 1944 von Neumann-Morganstern (1974), which
includes the inclusion of risk. The economic basis for General Deterrence Theory is thus
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based on utility theory. Therefore, General Deterrence Theory, within the context of
utility theory and the simple model of rational crime, will help to guide the study design,
development of the research instrument, and explanation of results.
There are three principles in the General Deterrence Theory. They are celerity,
severity, and certainty. The celerity is the frequency of punishment.31 Evidence has
shown that increased in actual audits reduce noncompliance rates. (Alm et al., 1992;
Bloomquist, 2009; Fischer et al., 1992; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Joulfaian & Rider, 1998).
Severity is the magnitude of the punishment. Studies have shown that imposing penalties
of 900 percent will deter individuals from becoming noncompliant (Morris, 2010).
Certainty is the perceived probability of detection. Please keep in mind that, depending
on selection criteria, the current IRS probability of detection is between 1 and 10 percent
(Johns & Slemrod, 2010; Joulfaian & Rider, 1998). Rasholnikov (2006) suggested that
decisions to evade are based on perceived probability of detection. As the literature on
audits explained (Alm et al., 2004; Clark et al., 2004; Collins & Plumlee, 1991), higher
perceived audit rate yield higher compliance.
Even though General Deterrence Theory is partially based on utility theory, it is
also derived from Exchange Theory, which is often used in sociology (Grasmick &
Green, 1980). This theory has been predominantly used in the fields of political science
and criminology, but has seen wide use in information systems security and economics as
well.
In the field of political science, General Deterrence Theory applies to the use of
military threats, normally in terms of nuclear threat, to deter other global players from
engaging in armed confrontation (Quackenbush, 2011a). More broadly, the theory assist
31

Celerity is not within the scope of these studies.

50

political scientist in understanding the resolution and de-escalation of different
international and interstate conflicts (Zagare, 2007)
With respect to information systems, General Deterrence Theory is used to
identify the antecedents that lead to system risks. Straub and Welke (1998) identified
four areas that minimize “system risks” (pg. 441). They classified these areas as
deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery. Willison and Warkentin (2013) define
these areas as:
Deterrence is the attempt to preclude unwanted behavior through incentives or
disincentives.
Prevention is any effort used to preclude the commission of a crime.
Detection is the identification of committed antisocial actions.
Remedy (or recovery) refers to methods or strategies developed to block future
commission of crimes.
Of the four areas identified above, deterrence and prevention are the best way to
decrease noncompliance (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Using these areas to minimize
risks within an IT setting, an enforcement compliance cycle was constructed to illustrate
where deterrence would apply to the tax noncompliance context.
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Figure 3 depicts the tax enforcement compliance cycle based on Willison and
Warkentin (2013) and the extended security action cycle of Straub and Welke (1998).
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Figure 3: Enforcement Compliance Cycle
As the figure shows, deterrence occurs after an individual has interacted with the
authority and has formed an opinion about the system. The idea behind implementing a
deterrence strategy is to curtail the motivation to engage in antisocial behaviors. This
process repeats itself every time when taxes are filed and paid.
With respect to criminology, General Deterrence Theory explains the use of
punishment as a method to control antisocial or criminal behavior. This strategy is in line
with the strategy proposed by the current IRS commissioner Koskinen, which relies on
providing strong disincentives for taxpayers to comply with the code (Koskinen, 2015).
For example, the IRS uses different deterrence methods for those who do not comply.
Possibly the most common methods currently in use are penalties and interests (P&I).
Depending on the violation committed, the severity of those penalties and interest could
increase and can reach up 100 percent of the amount owed (IRS, 2013; Morris, 2010). In
addition, there are costs associated to undergoing an audit and these increase the net cost
of noncompliance and lead to improved compliance regardless of audit outcome.
Noncompliant taxpayers can also incur interest on penalties, which further increases the
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cost of punishment. These and other deterrence tools, including imprisonment (which is
considered to be incapacitation or specific deterrence), encompass the arsenal available to
the IRS in deterring individuals from becoming noncompliant.
The notion of deterrence is broadly accepted and the literature explicates
individuals’ embarrassment of apprehension (Gordon, 1989; Grasmick & Green, 1980)
and “moral commitment to the law” (pg. 325) (Grasmick & Green, 1980) as being
motives for compliant behavior. Embarrassment and commitment combined with the
possibility of monetary and criminal punishment can coalesce to reduce antisocial
behavior. In this study, the criminal or antisocial behavior is the deliberate or accidental
tax payment noncompliance and much of the compliance literature argues the benefits of
deterrence in curbing these antisocial acts.
The model below, derived from Apel (2013) and Grasmick and Green (1980)
perceptual deterrence model, provides a visualization of how punishment deters
individuals’ antisocial behavior. In order to apply this model to employment tax
compliance some relevant modifications had to be made, but the model gives a mental
picture of how the current study will proceed to research the issues being raised.
The model shows how punishment, through sanctions, subjective norms, and
normative beliefs, impact a taxpayer’s perceived probability of detection, and how that
change in perception further impacts compliance levels. The model is split into two
general areas: the aggregate and the individual levels. The first construct is prescribed
punishment. This is nothing more than the laws that govern then enforcement of tax
noncompliance. The second column constructs are the general public’s observation and
perception of punishment. In essence, it is the perception the average taxpayer has once
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he/she acquires second hand experience of the punishment received by lawbreakers or the
interaction they have with other people in their lives.
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Beliefs

Probability of
Detection
Perception

Subjective
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Aggregate-level/Economics

Noncompliance
Audit and
P&I accessed

Individual-level/Sociology

Figure 4: Deterrence Model
The next construct is perceived probability of detection. This construct
distinguishes the aggregate-level from the individual-level. This construct is nothing
more than the perceived audit rate, which most taxpayers perceive it to be higher than the
actual rate (Alm et al., 1992; Scholz, 2003; Schulz, 2014). In this study, the introduction
of a safe harbor provision will explicitly alter the probability of detection for one group.
Therefore, it is expected that at the individual-level there will be an improved compliance
once the provision is chosen. The next column reflects whether the taxpayer was selected
for an audit. These two objects are dependent on whether or not the individual is
compliant (the last set of constructs in the flowchart).
Now that an explanation of how General Deterrence Theory fits this research, a
more in-depth discussion will investigate the three principles of General Deterrence
Theory – celerity, severity, and certainty.
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V.2.2 Principles of General Deterrence Theory
V.2.2.1 Celerity
Celerity is how quickly an individual receives punishment after committing a
crime. To put it in a quotidian context, celerity is the time it takes for a parent to
castigate a child after disobeying. The consensus is that the faster the punishment is
enacted (especially with small children and pets), the more effective is the deterrence. In
terms of the General Deterrence Theory, it is the imminence of punishment. Nagin and
Pogarsky (2001) propose that celerity, unlike severity and certainty, does not deter
antisocial behaviors. The argument is that sensible adults, unlike children and pets, do
understand the connections between delayed consequences of punishment and the
associated antisocial behavior. In other words for deterrence to work, immediate
punishment is not required.
In this study, the effects of celerity are not being studied. However, its effects
could be studied by charging penalties and interest at different time intervals (e.g., 6, 9,
12 months) after an audit identifies noncompliance.
V.2.2.2 Severity
The Oxford Dictionary defines severity as the fact or condition of being strict or
harsh (Oxford_Dictionaries, 2015). Within General Deterrence Theory, severity of
punishment is one of the biggest factor that influence the commission of antisocial
behavior (Grasmick & Green, 1980). According to Apel (2013), the severity of
punishment is the first principle that must be established in order to create deterrence.
The severity of an offence is determined by the law. The assessed punishments are
“remedies” for offending. Turk et al. (2007) explain that individuals’ filing behaviors are
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altered once a penalty and interests are imposed and Morris (2010) says that the
magnitude of the punishment has an impact on filing compliance.
This principle has been measured in prior experiments using three methods. The
first is to indicate what the law prescribes. The second method is for participants to
select the penalty they are most likely to receive. Lastly, participants would estimate the
probability of a penalty given an offence committed.
In the case of employment tax, severity of punishment includes all the different
deterrence tools the IRS currently has at its disposal and these are prescribed by the code.
However, a duly authorized individual, as defined by the code, cannot avoid personal
liability from these taxes. In other words, even when the firm dissolves, the employment
tax liabilities do not dissolve, but are simply transferred to duly authorized individuals.
This transfer of employment tax liabilities is an additional punishment of the duly
authorized individuals for failing to pay employment taxes.
For the purpose of this study, punishments assessed will also be prescribed as in
the tax code. Because the code dictates punishment and there is no expected change on
the horizon, there will be no adjustment to the severity of punishment as specified in the
code.
V.2.2.3 Certainty
Certainty references the degree of certainty or a probability that an eventuality
will occur (as in the certainty of getting caught cheating on taxes). In other words, it is
the likelihood that an event will take place, given prior information about this event.
Within the scope of this research, certainty is the risk of detection (Apel, 2013). Within
the tax literature, this is defined as the probability of detection or audit. Within General

56

Deterrence Theory, severity of punishment is the other biggest factor influencing
antisocial behavior (Grasmick & Green, 1980), but, according to Nagin and Pogarsky
(2001), it is the most influential factor in deterring antisocial behaviors.
This principle simply expresses the notion that the higher the degree of certainty
of being detected, the less likely an individual is to commit an antisocial act. Currently,
the probability of an audit is very low in the US. However, the probability of an audit for
employment tax is extremely high.
Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) Alerts, which identify employment tax payment
noncompliance, are done on a quarterly basis. This alerts are based on a systematically
review of employment tax payment over one year. Given the systematic review,
employers are more likely to be audited by the IRS. Apel (2013) concluded that when an
individual experiences a form of punishment (e.g., an audit), this experience will have an
impact on the perceived certainty of punishment.
V.3 Research Model
The research model provided in this study is based on the Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). As stated above, their original model was:
(1)
Where E(U) is the expected utility; p is the probability of detection (or audit)32; W
is income; X is reported income; Θ is the tax rate; and π is the penalty rate. If W is
greater than X, there is a tax gap. Simply, the right side of the equation provided a
formula of the gains

and the cost

associated with the final reporting decision. As mentioned above, and using formula,

32

Since the probability of automated/computerized audit is close 100 percent for employment tax, the
enforcement rate will be used to develop a more accurate constructs experienced by taxpayers.
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when the probability of detection (p) or penalty (Θ) increases, reporting improves
because the cost increases beyond the gains from underreporting. This same model could
be restated as a multistage model using the following equations:

Where

are the gains over t-time and

(2)
is the cost associated with being

discovered during that same period. By introducing a safe harbor provision, the
probability of detection is zero (0); therefore, penalties would also be zero. On the other
hand X would equal W, and the new equation for those how choose the safe harbor
provision will be:
(1a)
(2a)
It is important to remember that for those who do not choose the safe harbor
provision, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model would still apply.
The model below, derived from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, provides a
visualization of how the certainty of punishment deters individuals’ antisocial behavior,
holding celerity and severity constant.
Celerity of
Punishment

Certainty of
Punishment

Degree Pay
Compliance

(Probability of
detection)

Severity of
Punishment

Safe Harbor

Enforcement No Enforcement

Figure 5: Research Model
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VI LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION
Taxpayer compliance can be sub categorized into three groups: payment, filling,
and reporting compliance (Brown & Mazur, 2003). Of these sub categories, this study
will focus on payment compliance. While there has been a plethora of reporting and
filing compliance research, the same cannot be said about payment compliance (relative
to the other two sub categories). The main reason for focusing on payment compliance is
that the majority of employment tax noncompliance arises from payment noncompliance.
This is a direct result of high level of information matching from a third source, which
makes it easy to detect filing and reporting noncompliance. As the literature has shown,
noncompliance occurs where transaction visibility decreases.
The practical motivation of this study is to better understand this compliance sub
category and market segment, which account for $72 billion of the tax gap. Furthermore,
the Service has indicated an interest in improving voluntary compliance of employment
tax, and this research study could provide some insights on how to collaborate with this
important market segment in an epoch of diminishing budgets.
The theoretical motivation of this study is to enhance our understanding of
taxpayers’ antisocial behavior using General Deterred Theory. Deterrence is the impact
punishment has on those who have not committed an antisocial act (i.e., the externality of
punishment). In terms of tax enforcement, deterrence is the impact tax audits and
consequential punishments have on those individuals who have failed to meet their tax
requirements.
The General Deterrence Theory provides explanation as to how difference levels
of punishment influence antisocial behavior. Its economic foundation is based on
optimization of expected utility, which is one of the most common theories used to
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explain tax compliance behavior. In general, the measurement deterrence can be
achieved by calculating the change in criminal rate at different levels punishments
(Blumstein et al., 1978). This study will test the change in payment behavior when
different levels of certainty (i.e., probability of detection) are imposed
The research question is whether different tax regimes change the payment of
employment tax behavior for small business or self-employed taxpayers. The idea is to
determine if a safe harbor provision can reduce the proclivity of authorized individuals to
implement a payroll tax dilemma strategy and whether or it can reduce payment
noncompliance in time of economic distress (i.e., income shock).
The experiment will follow a similar design to Alm et al. (1992). Subjects will be
able to earn income. In addition, subjects will have a set number of employees who will
work a set number of hours at a set wage price. Using this information, subjects will
voluntarily report and pay employment taxes. Once filing and payment of employment
tax is completed, subjects will be subject to a random enforcement. If underreporting
and/or underpayment are detected during enforcement, the subject will be instructed to
pay the owed amount plus a 100 percent penalty on the amount owed (as prescribed by
the code). After several rounds, individuals will be asked to participate in a safe harbor
program. After several rounds under a safe harbor provision, an income shock (i.e.,
lower revenues) will be introduced to test the viability of an employment tax safe harbor
provision.
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VII HYPOTHESES
From the prior literature and theory development sections, there are four
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Business owners with higher tax liability thresholds will subscribe to a
safe harbor provision at a lower rate than business owners with the lower tax liability
thresholds.
Hypothesis 2a: Business owners who experience enforcement will have higher
subscription rate to a safe harbor provision than those who do not experience
enforcement.
Hypothesis 2b: Business owners who have experienced enforcements33 will have higher
compliance rates than those who do not experience enforcement.
Hypothesis 3: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will be more
compliant, with respect to payment.
Hypothesis 4: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will remain more
compliant after an income shock34 is experienced.

33
34

In this study, experiencing enforcements means undergoing an audit.
Income shock is defined as a 50 percent drop in firm revenue
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VIII

METHODS

Many of the models created over the past several decades have allowed
researchers to advance our learning about taxpayer behavior. Of those methods used to
acquire understanding, experimental design appears to be well suited to identify and
explain the discrepancies and inconsistencies associated with the economic models. This
method allows researchers “control over extraneous influences” (pg. 107) (Alm, 1991).
The experiment followed a similar design to Alm et al. (1992), using scenarios to
examine options and make choices in the laboratory setting with the hope of mimicking a
real life scenario. To achieve this, subjects were able to earn money. However, the
subjects were not able to make it based on how well they performed throughout the
experiment because of the delivery method and IRB constraints, as originally prescribed.
In addition, subjects were informed of important information about labor (e.g., number of
employees, number of worked hours, employee wages). Using this information, subjects
were asked to voluntarily report and pay employment taxes. Once filing and payment of
employment tax was completed, participants were subject to a random enforcement.35 If
underreporting and/or underpayment are detected during enforcement, the subject was
informed of audit results (change/no change), and if applicable, was instructed to pay the
amount owed as prescribed by the code. After several rounds, subjects were asked if they
wish to participate in a safe harbor program. After several rounds under a safe harbor
provision, an income shock (i.e., lower business revenues) was introduced to test the
viability of an employment tax safe harbor provision.

35

Since the conditional audit strategy for employment tax enforcement is unknown, a simple random
enforcement rate will be used.

62

It is important to know that this study did not attempt to identify different modes
of compliance amongst taxpayers. The interest of this study was focused on detection of
payment noncompliance and to potentially identify ways to encourage taxpayers to
voluntarily comply. In addition, this study was trying to determine if a safe harbor could
reduce the taxpayer burden, which accounts for $100 billion dollars per year in
deadweight loss to the economy.
VIII.1 Experimental Design
To answer the research question, an experiment36 was employed to examine
business owners’ behavior when making employment tax payments. The experimental
design was an impact study. An impact study measures the effects of enforcement and/or
the safe harbor provision on the subjects partaking in the experiment. This method has
been selected because it tends to have strong internal and conclusion validity
(Bhattacherjee, 2012; Fischer et al., 1992; Trochim & Donnelly, 2007c). This type of
experiment would only have strong external validity if the study took place in its normal
environment, as in a field experiment. Some realism is enacted by having the subjects
are real world business people and this enhances external validity even in a lab
experiment.
VIII.1.1

Validity

As mentioned earlier, the method utilized in this study was selected because it
tends to have strong internal, external and conclusion validity. Internal validity
indicates whether observable changes to compliance are in fact affected by the

36

In an ideal setting, this study would be “field” experiment by randomly selecting actual business owners
from know IRS data sources. It would not use students in a lab nor would it use a purposive sampling. The
business owners would follow the lab experiment, and they would be randomly selected.
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introduction of a safe harbor provision. To ensure internal validity, Bhattacherjee (2012)
suggest meeting three conditions – covariation of cause and effect, temporal precedence,
and no plausible alternative explanation. By meeting these conditions, the experiment is
able to manipulate the independent variables through treatments and observe its effects
on the dependent variable and control for extraneous variables. To do so, random
assignment was used. By utilizing random assignment, it is expected that this limitation
is diminished and external validity is improved (Heinsman & Shadish, 1996; Ong-Dean,
Huie Hofstetter, & Strick, 2011; Shadish, Clark, & Steiner, 2008). In this process, two
groups were created in which subjects with similar employment tax characteristics had
the same probability of assignment and neither study administrators nor subjects had the
capability of choosing which group they are assigned.
External validity indicates whether observable changes can be generalized to the
population. The easiest way to achieve external validity is to draw a random sample from
the population. Although the targeted population is known for a given point in time, this
information is not easily accessible. Therefore, the finding will be based on the group of
subject that participated in this experiment.
VIII.1.2

Experiment

For the pretest, eight known associates completed the study. Subjects were
recruited from the Georgia State University EDB student and alumni body and known
associates from the accounting field (e.g., CPAs) and business owners. These
individuals first completed the experiment. Then, they were asked a few open-ended
questions about the flow of the experiment, and the content to minimize
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misunderstanding by future subjects about employment tax, the safe harbor provision,
and Form 94X.
Themes did materialize with the initial interviews about the information provided
in the balance sheet (Appendix A). Minor changes were made to provide some relevant
information pre-test subjects thought were necessary to make informed decisions. Before
the web experiment went live, a Qualtrics team evaluated the experiment’s logic flow to
ensure proper random assignments throughout the experiment.
The other step is the experiment. In this step, subjects were randomly assigned
into one of two groups (high tax liability threshold and low tax liability threshold). There
were 105 subjects randomly assigned to low tax liability threshold and 100 subjects
randomly assign to high tax liability threshold for a total of 205 subjects.
For subjects to continue their participation in the experiment, they had to agree to
the informed consent, and selected that they reside in the United States. They also had to
identify if they ever had any personal involvement with the employment tax process by
doing any of following:





Filed employment taxes with state or federal agencies
Made employment taxes payments to state or federal agencies
Supervised the filing or payment of employment taxes to the state or federal
agencies
Assisted a business with the filing or payment of employment taxes to the state or
federal agencies
This question satisfied experiment criteria: (1) Has the recruit filed employment

taxes or paid employment taxes in the last year and/or (2) Has the recruit supervised the
filing of employment tax or supervised the payment of employment taxes in the last year?
Once the subject has decided to participate and fulfilled the informed consent and
the criteria requirements, he/she would be able to complete the web-based test. Before
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random assignment, the test requires subjects to responding to a series of questions to
assess their perception of audit, misreporting, and penalties.
After that, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups: high or low tax
liability thresholds. Research has shown that individuals with higher tax liability
threshold exhibit higher risk seeking behaviors, and individuals with lower tax liability
threshold exhibit risk adverse behaviors (Robben et al., 1990) and these results are
expected to be exhibited in this study. After random assignment, all subjects had to
complete a practice round, which required subjects to respond to a battery of questions.
These questions were intended to create a realistic scenario with respect to filing and
payment of employment tax. Questions mimicked the filing and payment of a simple
IRS Form 940. The intention of a simplified Form 940 was to minimize confusion and
boredom.
Since the literature has indicated that tax decisions evolve using information
obtained over the course of several years, this process of responding to the battery of
questions was repeated six more times. This was done to follow the recommendations
provided by Alm (1991), which recommends utilizing several rounds to enhance the
sense of realism. With that said, Alm (1991) does suggest that lab experiments are
unable to perfectly replicate real life compliance decisions that can be influenced by
normative beliefs and subjective norms. Although this study was intended to simulate six
employment tax filing and payment cycles, subjects were told that there are an unknown
number of rounds in this experiment.
It is expected one of the most important pieces of information an individual will
continuously assess is the probability of an audit. As the literature showed, this
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probability will shift depending on whether or not the individual was audited after
underreporting and inevitably underpaying (Andreoni et al., 1998; Turk et al., 2007).
Since the probability of audit (at least automated audit) is approximately 100 percent for
employment tax, the enforcement rate will be used to develop the construct experienced
by taxpayers. The enforcement rate indicates to taxpayer when the tax authorities
physically (or through a letter) interact with taxpayers.
During the experiment, subjects had the opportunity receive income and pay taxes
for their firm. In addition, individual had the opportunity to report (or underreport) their
employment tax liability and tax payment. If enforcement was undertaken and subjects
were found to have underreported employment tax, penalties were imposed. No
enforcement took place in the first round, but all other rounds were subject to a random
enforcement. The experiment is divided into four phases: random assignment, random
assignment with enforcement, self-assignment, and income shock. The first phase
consisted of one round and it provided the baseline measure. The second and third
phases consist of two rounds each. The last phase consists of one round. Figure 6
illustrates the round process (see Section 8.3 for more details). After the third round was
completed, individuals had the option to accept or reject a safe harbor provision. A safe
harbor provision specifies conditions that protect individuals or firms from being deemed
in violation of the Internal Revenue Code and subject to an IRS audit. Examples of the
safe harbor rules are 401(k) rule, W-2 wages rule, telecommunication conversion of
capitalized assets under §263(a), and electric transmission and distribution property under
§263(a) or §162. The following two rounds will provide the control parameters for the
safe harbor provision.
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Figure 6: Test Phase Process
Once subjects have completed five rounds of employment tax filing and payment
simulations, subjects completed one additional round in which they were exposed to an
income shock (intervention). This intervention was to determine if subjects fell into the
payroll tax dilemma under a safe harbor provision, and to see whether the provision
minimizes the discrepancy between taxes paid and taxed owed for those who subscribe to
it.37 Secondly, the intervention allowed the investigator to test the differences between
those taxpayers who have large and low tax liability.
VIII.1.3

Social Desirability Bias

Social desirability bias is associated with individuals participating in surveys. In
essence, individuals try to respond to questions in a manner that satisfies the proctor of
the survey or respond to questions in a socially desirable way – “fake good or fake bad”
(pg. 394) (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Krumpal (2013) suggest that the individual is
engaging in the self-preservation of his/her image. Social desirability bias tends to occur

37

The discrepancy will be defined and the “willingness to pay” in the Data Analysis section of the
prospectus
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in areas of personal or social discomfort, such as, personal weight, voting, taxes, drug
use, and sexual preference (Gittelman et al., 2015; Myung-Soo, Nelson, & Kiecker,
1997). This bias tends to magnify the end of the scale responses (e.g. very satisfied)
(Myung-Soo et al., 1997). It becomes necessary to guard against social desirability bias
because of its impact of survey responses and because this experiment engages on a
socially sensitive issue – taxes.
Some of the research studies have shown that social desirability bias takes two
forms: individuals characteristics and survey characteristics (Krumpal, 2013). Since the
investigator was able to test for individual characteristics, investigator focused on
improvising the survey characterizes in order to reduce social desirability bias. One
method that has shown to reduce the social desirability bias is through use of indirect
(Fisher, 1993) and direct questions (Myung-Soo et al., 1997). The difference between
indirect and direct questions is that indirect questions ask the subject to project on other
people versus making statements about him/her. The idea of asking both we check for
social desirability bias while maintaining measurement validity.
Another method for reducing social desirability bias is to portrait some
conjectural distance to the tasks in the study. For example, the instructions in the
experiment could tell the subject that they are a contractor for a small business or a
typical small business owner. In both cases, the instructions are setting the subject to
think in a certain manner. This method was used in this experiment.
Burton-Jones (2009) also explains that social desirability measurement can be
distorted from three sources: raters, instrument, and process. The rater error could be
minimized by clearly defining the rater (Burton-Jones, 2009). For this experiment, the
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rater was a duly authorized individual of a small business. For this experiment, the raters
were asked, “to play the role of the typical small business owner with several fulltime
employees.”
VIII.1.4

Probability of Detection or Enforcement

The IRS audits selection is not random (IRS, 2006) and it is probability is not
constant (Andreoni et al., 1998). As the literature shows, the IRS audit strategies are
similar to conditional or strategic audit rule used to determine the probability of detection
and appear to be the best plausible option available for the authorities, in term of
maximizing compliance. Although the actual audit rate for employment tax is unknown
to the public, the IRS audit levels of employment tax can be expected to be relatively
high38 and does have a high level of third party reporting. Most of the third party
matching is completed automatically and only those automated audits that appear to have
irregularities are more closely examined and experience enforcement.
The examinations that require closer review are the type examinations taxpayers
associate as undergoing an enforcement action. Since taxpayers do not experience any
form of automated audit unless selected for further examination, enforcement rate will be
used when discussing employment tax audit. Enforcement rate is a better construct for
this experiment since taxpayers are more likely to experience the enforcement process
than the audits.
Given audit rates are high and the expected enforcement rate also relatively high
for the remaining identified taxpayers, a 50 percent random enforcement regime was used
in this experiment. The
38

The employment tax deposits are analyzed for payment compliance in all businesses that have a weekly
and semiweekly deposit requirement. This analysis is tantamount to an audit and it constituted a large
portion of employers.
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Table 2 shows the expected probability of enforcement for the random assignment
section using a 50 percent random enforcement selection criterion over three rounds.
Table 2: Enforcement Probability for the Random Assignment Section
2 Enforcements
One Enforcement
One Enforcement
No Enforcement

1st Rounds

2nd Rounds

3rd Rounds

No Enforcement
No Enforcement
No Enforcement
No Enforcement

Enforcement
No Enforcement
Enforcement
No Enforcement

Enforcement
Enforcement
No Enforcement
No Enforcement

Probability
25%
25%
25%
25%

The for enforcements.
Table 3 below provided the probability of enforcement for the self-assigned safe
harbor section using a 50 percent random enforcement selection criterion for
enforcements.
Table 3: Enforcement Probability for the Self-Assignment Section
Two Enforcement
One Enforcement
No Enforcement

Probability
25%
50%
25%

The Table 4 below provides the expected probability of enforcement for the entire
experiment. However, a sizable number of subjects subscribed to the safe harbor
provision, and the probability decreased substantially for two to five enforcements and
the probability of no enforcement increased. Further information is provided in the
Findings section.
Table 4: Enforcement Probability for the Experiment
Probability
Four Enforcements
Three Enforcements
Two Enforcement
One Enforcement
No Enforcement

15.6%
31.3%
31.3%
15.6%
6.2%
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VIII.1.5

Tax Liability Thresholds Selection – the Tax Rate

The tax liability threshold selection was derived using the suggestions of prior
research on income threshold selection. In some studies, researchers have suggested
using thresholds of total gross receipts greater $25,000 or total gross receipts greater than
$100,000, including Erard (2002). To understand the reasoning, analysis of different
individual and business tax data were conducted. The IRS 2003 SOI Data “Table 2:
Selected financial data on businesses” data showed approximately 25.4 small businesses
existed during that point in time (including approximately 3.3 million small
corporations). Of the 25.4 small business 60.7 percent of them made less than $25,000 in
total gross receipts and had an average tax liability of $160, and 81.2 percent of them
made less than $100,000 in total gross receipts with an average tax liability of $168.
Although this information is useful in identifying characteristics of smaller
business, such as their general earnings potential and business tax owed, it does not
provide any indication of employment tax liability, but total gross receipts thresholds. To
obtain a proxy of employment tax liability some calculations were made using different
IRS data tables. IRS 2013 “Table 1.1 All Returns: Selected Income and Tax Items, by
Size and Accumulated,” shows an average adjusted gross income of $61,700 and an
average individual income tax liability of $13,065. Using the aggregate data and the
employment tax rates, an average in trust amount was calculated and it is approximately
$22,500.39 From this amount, employers owe an average of approximately $4,700 for
each employee. Using this information, a definition of high and low tax liability
threshold was defined. This amount would be the same as the imposed tax rate. The
39

The estimations were calculated using income data. Income data is positively skewed, so it safe to
assume that the median amounts are lower than the average amounts provided. Nevertheless, they provide
an approximation of thresholds.
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lower employment tax rate required employers to pay $2,500 per employee and the high
require a payment of $6,750 per employee. Hence, the lower tax liability threshold pays
a lower tax rate than individuals assigned to the high tax liability threshold.
VIII.1.6

Population of Interest and Sampling Design

The population of interest in this study was all authorized individuals from small
and self-employed firms. A duly authorized individual is defined as individuals or
officers who oversee the collection, accounting, and payment of employment tax (IRS,
2013). This could be restated as someone who is personally liable for the payment of
employment tax withholdings deposits even after the firm becomes insolvent.
Although the population of this study is well defined, the sampling frame for this
study was not accessible. Because of this limitation, the sampling design was a purposive
sampling. This sampling technique was used to ensure that subjects undertaking this
experiment meet the described criteria.
Using a non-probability sampling technique will most likely lead to invalid
confidence intervals and sampling errors (Alreck & Settle, 1995), and it does not allow
researchers to make inferences about the population. However to overcome this
limitation, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups using a table of random
numbers. By randomly assigning subjects into one of the two groups, a randomize
experiment was created and internal validity was ascertained (Trochim & Donnelly,
2007b). Internal validity allows researchers to establish causal relationship between
dependent and independent variables.
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VIII.1.7

Sample size

The sample size of this study is based on the a-priori sample size calculation for
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The sample size calculation was computed using
G*power. A-priori sample size calculation is use to reduce type II error. Using this
calculation, the minimum sample size to obtain a power of 0.83 is 16 observations per
cell. The larger the sample size for each cell will lead to smaller standard errors and
larger power. The sample size anticipated for this study is 200 subjects. This allows for
approximately 50 observations per cell, which result in a statically power of over 0.95.
Given that the safe harbor provision is self-assigned, it possible that cells size may differ.
VIII.1.8

Unit of Observation and Unit of Analysis

The research design collected data at the individual taxpayer level. Therefore, the
unit of observation was small business self-employed taxpayers who filed or paid
employment tax in prior years. Since study was identifying behavioral differences
between those who subscribed and those who did not subscribe to a safe harbor
provision, the unit of analysis was also small business self-employed taxpayers.
VIII.1.9

Implementing the Penalties and Interest

The code provides two ways to calculate civil tax penalties for tax evasion: fixed
dollar amount or fixed percentage (Rasholnikov, 2006). The idea for fixed dollar amount
is to signal certainty and to remove any ambiguity as to the dollar amount of the assessed
penalty and interest. In general, this amount increases depending on the severity of the
violation. Fix dollar amounts are more likely to be used with violations that are more
serious. The fixed percent is a fix percent of underreported amount. As with fixed dollar
amount, the percentage imposed is dependent on the severity of the infraction. For
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example, employment tax has a recovery penalty of 100 percent while penalty for
negligent understatements is 20 percent.40
In addition, the fix penalty amount is useful in cases where the amount owed can
be significantly different. To illustrate, suppose you have to small business owners. One
owes $10,000 and the other owes $1 million. It would be draconian to change $50,000 to
the one owing $10,000 and a mere slap on the wrist for the one owing $1 million. Given
the potential variation in noncompliance amounts, using fix percentage for
underreporting amounts maintains a fair and equitable treatment of all individuals before
the law. Since fix percentage is dictated by Publication 15, this research study will do
the same. The mandated percentage is 100 percent.
VIII.1.10

Safe Harbor and Self-Assignment

In this study, subjects were instructed to decide whether to participate in a safe
harbor program. Under met conditions, a safe harbor provision will minimize taxpayers’
legal responsibilities and should reduce the cost of compliance. In this study, subjects
will self-assign their participation in the safe harbor provision by simply checking a box.
This decision will take place after several rounds of the experiment. By the time subjects
were confronted with this decision, approximately half of all subjects would have been
selected and experienced enforcement. Furthermore, for those who had experienced
enforcement, many of them were informed that enforcement had taken place and sanction
(i.e., penalties and interest) were assess.
As the literature has suggested, the audit rate will have impact on the compliance
rate, and for employment tax this rate is relatively high. Rasholnikov (2006) also

40

§ 6662(a)–(b)(1)
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suggested that taxpayers will voluntarily report their filing violations if the sanctions
imposed by tax authorities fall below their expectations. He also proposed that taxpayers
would voluntarily comply with their tax obligations if their expected penalties were equal
or greater to those imposed by the authorities. Furthermore, Alm (1991) suggested that
amnesty will increase compliance in the short-run.
Two examples that illustrate these concepts are Voluntary Worker Classification
Settlement Program and the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program. In both of
these programs, the IRS lowered the penalties to improve voluntary compliance. The
Voluntary Worker Classification Settlement Program allowed employers, who are not
currently being audited, to reclassify their workers and make minimal payments on prior
tax obligations without having to pay penalties or interest. The 2012 Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Program allowed taxpayers who have undisclosed offshore income to report
their income by a given due date to reduce their penalties and eliminate their chances of a
criminal prosecution. In this two examples illustrate how Rasholnikov (2006) suggestion
apply.
From our knowledge of taxpayer behavior, it can be concluded that taxpayers who
face high audit or enforcement rate and the possibility of reduced penalties are more
likely to subscribe to a safe harbor provision. Kalambokidis et al. (2012) illustrated that
individuals were willing to pay a fee for a burden reduction. In addition, it can be
concluded that individuals who are not compliant but expectations of penalties are higher
than those associated with a safe harbor provision are also expected to subscribe to the
provision. Therefore, it is expected that only those who are not compliant and have lower
expectation of sanctions will not subscribe to the safe harbor provision.
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VIII.2 Data Analysis
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was chosen as the data analysis technique.
ANOVA is beneficial because it allows for the violation of equal cell variances and
differences in-group means (Lindman, 1970). In this study design, subjects were
randomly assigned into either low or high tax liability threshold groups. This groups are
defined by the amount owed to the tax authorizes at the end of each round. The benefit
of random assigned is that investigators can assume probabilistic equivalence (Trochim
& Donnelly, 2007a). Therefore, ANOVA is be able assess the casual relationship
between the two independent variables (tax rate, enforcement regime, safe harbor
provision, and income shock) and the dependent variables compliance by measuring the
mean differences amongst groups. Furthermore, ANOVA is an appropriate tool for
analyzing binary data (Lunney, 1970), and it was used in this study. Since the data
allowed, regression modeling was used to identify the safe harbor subscription drivers
and the employment tax payment compliance drivers.
VIII.3 Test Phase
This study was split into four phases. In all phases, subjects’ firm was able to earn
income and had a set number of employees who worked a set number of hours at a set
wage price. Subjects were also informed that enforcement was going to be conducted
thought the experiment. On the other hand, subjects were not informed as to the
probability of audit or enforcement. Using this information subjects voluntarily reported
and paid employment taxes. Compliance was measured at the completion of each round.
Phase 1 consist of randomly assigning subjects to a group. Phase 2 introduces
enforcement regime. Phase 3 introduces the safe harbor provision. Phase 4 introduces
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income shock. The following sections will provide additional information to the
mechanic and data obtained in each phase. A general layout of all rounds is provided in
Figure 6: Test Phase Process.
VIII.3.1

Phase 1

Phase 1 set out to answer the first hypothesis of this study. To do so, subjects
were randomly assigned to a group – denoted by R. The random assignment was
determined by high or low tax liability threshold, which are denoted as subscripts H and
L respectively. The lower employment tax liability threshold was set at $2,500 and the
high was set at $6,750 per employee.
The O denotes the measured outcome, and it is the difference between reported
amount and actual amounts reported and paid. For this phase/round, it identifies the
baseline measure for the experiment. Figure 7 provides a visual assessment of the two
rounds within Phase 1. This round is a 2X0, and it will be used as a control group for all
analysis.

RH1

O1

RL1

O1

Figure 7: Phase 1 Random Assignment Design.
Once subjects were assigned to a group, subjects remained in that group for the
remainder of the experiment.
VIII.3.2

Phase 2

Phase 2 consisted of two rounds, and it sets out to answer hypotheses 2a and 2b.
As in Phase I, subjects’ firm earned income and it had a set number of employees who
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will work a set number of hours at a set wage price, which was used to voluntarily report
and pay employment taxes.
Unlike Phase 1, subjects were subject to a random enforcement (please see
Section 6.1.4 for more details on the probability of enforcement). The subject was
subsequently informed of the audit results. If underreporting and/or underpayment were
detected during the enforcement process, the subject were instructed to pay the owed
amount plus a 100 percent penalty on the amount owed as prescribed by the code.
Figure 8 provides a visual assessment of the two rounds within Phase 2. The
letter R denotes random assignment and subscript H and L denote high and low tax
liability thresholds. The number under each letter identifies rounds. For example, round
2 high tax liability threshold random assignments is denoted as RH2. The X is
enforcement treatment. The measure outcomes – O – was difference between reported
and paid amount and actual reported and paid amounts. The opportunity to earn income
is based on the scenario of the experiment (see Appendix A).

Phase 2
Round 2

Round 3

RH2

X2

O2

RH3

X3

O3

RL2

X2

O2

RL3

X3

O3

RH2

O2

RH3

O3

RL2

O2

RL3

O3

Figure 8: Phase 2 Random Assignment Design.
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VIII.3.3

Phase 3

Phase 3 consists of two rounds, and it set out to answer hypothesis 3. To answer
the hypothesis, Phase 3 introduced into the decision process the safe harbor provision
under the same enforcement regime. As with prior phases, subjects undertook the same
tasks to voluntarily reporting and paying of employment taxes.
Subjects received a random enforcement treatment, but only if they did not
subscribe to the safe harbor provision at the end of Phase 2 and adhered to requirements.
If underreporting and/or underpayment were detected during the enforcement process, the
subjects were instructed to pay the owed amount plus a 100 percent penalty on the
amount owed as prescribed by the code.
Figure 9 provides a visual assessment of the two rounds within Phase 3. As in
Phase 2, the letter R denotes random assignment and subscript H and L denote high and
low tax liability thresholds. The number under each letter identifies rounds. The C
denotes individuals in who subscribed to the safe harbor provision, which uses a cutoff
score. The X implies the enforcement treatment. The O is measured outcomes.

Figure 9: Phase 3 Randomize Design with a Cutoff
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VIII.3.4

Phase 4

Phase 4 consists of one round, and it sets out to answer hypothesis 4 by
introducing an income shock. This manipulation will allow testing difference between all
prior treatments. As with prior phases, subjects were able to earn income and had set
number of employees who worked a set number of hours at a set wage price, which can
be used to voluntarily report and pay employment taxes.
In this phase, subjects were not subject to a random enforcement. It is expected
that with and income shock some of the subjects may not adhere to the safe harbor
provision, and may undertake noncompliant behavior (Please see Findings section for
details). Once this section was completed, the phase portion of the study ended.
VIII.4 Measuring Risk Appetite
To control for risk appetite in the selection of the safe harbor provision and
potential control for compliance behaviors, a risk attitude scale was constructed. This
scale is based on Joost and Smidts (2000) and Lampenius and Zickar (2005). The
questions were asked to all subjects, and the questions were staggered between
speculative risk and risk control. These questions are provided on Table 5.
The data will be analyzed for reliability using scale analysis (Cronbach's alpha),
which is the central measurement of internal consistency. To analyze validity of the risk
appetite construct, factor analysis was used. Although factor analysis is not primarily
used for validity, the results in the component metric and orthogonal rotational matrix
could be robust indicator of validity. Given these questions have been used in prior
studies, it is expected that the Cronbach’s alpha results will yield acceptable internal
consistencies (α > 0.7 (Nunnally, 1994)). Furthermore, it is expected that the variable
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should load into two distinct groups (Speculative Risk and Risk control), validating the
construct. (Please see Finding section for results)
Table 5: Risk Construct
Risk

Questions
I see risk as an opportunity to make money

Speculative
Risk

I like taking big financial risks
I get a thrill out of investing
When I complete my taxes forms I am willing to make aggressive reporting
activities
When I invest money a safe return is very important to me
When I invest I plan on having a specific amount at a future date

Risk
Control

It is important to know with how much money my investment will provide
me in the future
I consult a tax adviser when completing my taxes
I pro-actively manage tax filing process with the aim of minimizing risk of
enforcement

Scales
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree
AgreeDisagree

In addition, there were questions on perception of the probability of enforcement
and the penalty rate. These questions are provided in

82

Table 6. These particular questions on the probability of enforcement were
requested at the start and the end of the experiment. The table below provides the
questions provided at the end of the experiment. The penalty rate was only asked at the
end of the experiment to determine change in perception to audit and penalty to
employment tax payment.

83

Table 6: Enforcement, Timing and Penalty Questions
Questions

Probability of
Enforcement

Penalty Rate

Timing

From your interaction with the IRS, what do you think is the
likelihood of employment tax enforcement? (please provide a
percent)
If you miss report on your employment tax filling, what do you
think is the likelihood that IRS will question the amount reported?
(please provide a percent)
After completing this experiment, what do you think was the
enforcement rate for this experiment? (please provide a percent)
If caught and successfully prosecuted, what do you think the
employment tax penalties would be? (please provide a percent)
After completing this experiment, what do you think was the
penalty for failure to pay employment tax? (please provide a
percent)
If I am caught and successfully prosecuted, how much time do you
think it would take the IRS to prosecute?

Scales
Percent

Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Open ended
(rating scale)

VIII.5 Additional Test Details
VIII.5.1

Recruitment

The source for recruitment pre-test was investigator-initiated in-person contact
and emails. The recruitment script has been developed to ensure consistent screening and
to provide potential subject the ability to opt-out of the research study. In addition, a
handout was developed with pertinent information for those individual who accept and
qualify to be subjects. Some of the information provided includes study web page and
the expected duration of study. An email script has been attached. Online recruitment
for the test portion of the experiment was done using Qualtrics’ assistance.
VIII.5.2

Funding and Compensation

All the compensation was monetary. The funding source for this study was the
student PI’s own personal income. The student PI did not receive any grants or
sponsorship of any kind. The student PI paid Qualtrics for each participant, and Qualtrics
compensated subjects five dollars for their participation as approved by the IRB. This
payment system was easy, fast, and free for those receiving moneys. This payment
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process diverged from the Google Wallet, but I permitted subjects to receive payment
without the need to create a Google Wallet account. Furthermore, without the student
PI’s knowledge, Qualtrics also compensated the participants an additional $4 from the
student PI’s payment to Qualtrics. This payment means that all participants received a
flat fee of $9 regardless of treatment/answers for participating in the study.
VIII.6 Deviations from Original Design
This subsection discusses the deviation from the proposed methods identified in
Section 8 of this document.
Although ANOVA analysis was conducted as prescribed by the measures section,
additional nonparametric statistics were ran for each round of the experiment. The
Pearson’s χ2 was used for categorical variables while the Fisher Exact test was used for
binary variables. These different nonparametric tests were used because they are more
appropriate for the data obtained in this experiment. Nevertheless, the ANOVA analysis
and the non-parametric test yielded similar results and both were used in the discussion of
our findings.
Another deviation from the methods section was payment to subjects. The
prescribed payment for participating in this experiment was five dollars paid using
Google wallet. However, Qualtrics directly paid the subjects and Google wallet was not
used in the payment. In addition, participants were paid nine dollars instead of five.
A third deviation was the number of subject who participated. The original
method section indicated that 15 subjects were to participate in the pre-test. However,
only eight subjects participated in the pre-test. For the test, 200 subjects were to
complete the experiment. However, the way Qualtrics cutoff the participation, it led to

85

an additional five subjects to participate. The total number of participants was intended
to be 215, but ultimately 213 participated. No pre-test participants were included in the
analysis of the results since changes were made.
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IX FINDINGS
IX.1 General Demographics of Subjects
The data below shows how subjects who participated in the study are involved in
the employment tax process. The results are provided on Table 7. Approximately 40
percent of participants had been involved in the filing and or payment process in a single
capacity, with “Employee” accounting for over 50 percent of those. At the other
extreme, 6.8 percent of participants were involved in the process in all capacities.
Table 7: Involvement with Employment Tax Filing and Payment Process
Accountant
Lawyer
Business Owner
Manager
Employee
All Capacities
Two Involvement Capacities
Three Involvement Capacities
Four Involvement Capacities
Other
Total

Frequency

Percent

8
1
21
7
45
14
54
33
15
7
205

3.9
0.5
10.2
3.4
22.0
6.8
26.3
16.1
7.3
3.4
100

Of those who chose “Two Involvement Capacities,” they selected employee 66.7
percent of the time, and managers 59.3 percent of the time. All other options were
selected less that 50 percent of the time.
Of those who had chosen “Three Involvement Capacities,” they selected
employee 90.9 percent of the time, managers 87.9 percent of the time, business owner
63.6 percent of the time and Accountant 51.5 percent of the time. All other options were
selected less that 50 percent of the time.
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Of those who had chosen “Four Involvement Capacities,” they selected
accountant 100 percent of the time, manager 93.3 percent of the time, and business owner
86.7 percent of the time. All other options were selected less that 50 percent of the time.
Table 8 shows the geographical breakdown of participants. Although this information
cannot be used to infer to the population of interest, that is, all small business owners and
tax managers, it shows that participation came from throughout the United States and it
was not concentrated in one particular area in the US. Therefore, we believe that the
sampling is reasonable and will provide interesting observations even though it is not,
strictly speaking, and a random sample.
Table 8: Geographical Breakdown of Participating Subjects
Frequency
Alabama
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawai'i
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

3
6
15
5
2
2
25
12
1
9
4
1
1
6
3
4
7
2

Percent
1.5
2.9
7.3
2.4
1
1
12.2
5.9
0.5
4.4
2
0.5
0.5
2.9
1.5
2
3.4
1

Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin

Frequency

Percent

3
2
3
6
14
5
8
3
4
15
1
2
1
7
11
1
3
4

1.5
1
1.5
2.9
6.8
2.4
3.9
1.5
2
7.3
0.5
1
0.5
3.4
5.4
0.5
1.5
2

IX.2 Risk Appetite Analysis and Enforcement Perception
To control for risk appetite in the selection of the safe harbor provision and
potential control for compliance behaviors, a risk attitude scale was constructed. The
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data was analyzed for reliability using scale analysis, which is the key statistic for of
reliability. To analyze the construct validity of the risk appetite construct, factor analysis
was used.
IX.2.1 Reliability
Using questions derived from prior studies, a scale for risk was created and was
tested to control for risk appetite in the selection of the safe harbor provision and
potential control for compliance behaviors. Table 9 shows the results for the Cronbach’s
alpha tests. The results in this study yielded acceptable internal consistencies (α > 0.7
(Nunnally, 1994)), and Cronbach’s alpha and the Tukey analysis show no difference
between items. Therefore, the analyses rely on high level of internal consistency in the
measures.
Table 9: Cronbach’s Alpha Results
Risk type
Speculative control
Risk control

Cronbach’s alpha
0.776
0.765

Number of items
4
5

IX.2.2 Validity
Table 10 shows the results for construct validity testing for both risk components
(Speculative Risk and Risk control). These results were obtained using principal
component methods and Varimax rotation. As the table shows, the variables of interest
loaded into two distinct components providing evidence that the components are
construct-valid. Variable loading below 0.4 were suppressed to easily identify the loading
factors (Hair, 1998, 2014).
One of the variables, “I get a thrill out of investing,” loaded into both
components. However, it has a 0.466 loading score, which indicates a weaker measure
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for risk control. Nevertheless because of its score, this variable will be kept in both
components. The total variance explained using this model was 58.8 percent.
Table 10: Factor Analysis for Risk
Components
Risk
Control
I see risk as an opportunity to make money.
When I invest money, a safe return is very important to me.
I like to take big financial risks.
When I invest, I plan on having a specific amount at a future date.
I get a thrill out of investing.
It is important to know how much money my investment will provide
me in the future.
I consult a tax advice when completing my taxes.
When completing my taxes, I am willing to make aggressive reporting
activities.
I proactively manage the tax filing process with the aim of minimizing
risk of audit.

Speculative
Risk
0.827

0.770
0.887
0.763
0.466

0.629

0.769
0.539
0.661
0.726

Additional tests were run to ensure sampling adequacy was suitable for the test.
KMO statistics provide analysis on variance and it provides guidance on the usefulness of
factor analysis. In essence, it tests whether or not the sample is sufficient given the
number of variables used in the factor analysis conducted. Results should be greater than
0.70 for factor analysis to be useful (Kaiser, 1974; Stewart, 1981). The KMO result was
0.736 indicating that the data structure is adequate.
The Bartlett's test of sphericity checks to see if the correlation matrix is an
identity matrix. The presence of an identify matrix implies no correlation between the
variables used in the factor analysis conducted. Since there has to be some relationship
between the variables used to construct a component, an identify matrix would not be
suitable for factor analysis. For suitable results, a number below 0.05 is expected (IBM,
2017; Stewart, 1981). In this case, the expected value was below 0.05 (a statistic of
0.000). Consequently, our data is suitable and our components are valid. Predictive
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analyses using these results are located in Section Logistic Regression Control
Compliance
IX.2.3 Probability of Enforcement and Penalty Rate
IX.2.3.1 Changes to Probability of Enforcement
The average perceived pre-test audit rate was 40.3 percent, and the post-test
results showed a 74.9 percent perceived audit rate. This is a 34.9 percent increase. To
determine whether the pre-test audit rate had an impact on the post-test audit rate, a oneway ANOVA was run using a 5 percent alpha protection level. The results showed that
there was no statistical difference (p-value = 0.113) between perceived pre and post-test
audit rate. The results indicate that the pre-test audit rate (independent variable) had no
substantial affected the post-test audit rates (dependent variable).
IX.2.3.2 Changes to Penalty Rate
The average perceived pre-test penalty rate was 262.0 percent, and the post-test
results showed a 92.9 percent perceived audit rate. This was a 169.1 percent decrease, in
absolute terms. This information implies that payment compliance is improved once the
safe harbor provision became available to subjects. To determine if there was a statistical
difference in the subjects’ perception of the audit rate, a one-way ANOVA was also run
using the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. The results showed that
there was no statistical difference (p-value = 0.805) between perceived pre and post-test
rate of audit rate indicating that compliance did not increase. Although the reduction in
penalty rate seemed large, the insignificant results from the ANOVA could be in part
attributed to the large standard deviation within the data (142.2 and 48.7 percent
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respectively). Given the results, additional logistic regression analyses were conducted.
Those results are found in Section IX.3.6.
IX.3 Hypothesis testing
From the prior literature and theory development sections, there are four
hypotheses tested. There are three possible outcomes: accepted, rejected, and partial
acceptance. Accepted indicates that all the results indicate that the hypothesis is
supported. Rejected indicates that all the results indicate that the hypothesis is not
supported. Partial acceptance indicates that some of the results do support the
hypothesis, but not all them.
Table 11: Results by Hypothesis
Null Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: Business owners within the higher tax liability thresholds will have lower
subscription to a safe harbor provision than business owners within the lower tax liability
thresholds.
Hypothesis 2a: Business owners who experience enforcement will have higher
subscription rate to a safe harbor provision than those who do not experience
enforcement.
Hypothesis 2b: Business owners who experience enforcements will have higher
payment compliance rate than those who do not experience enforcement.
Hypothesis 3: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will be more
compliant, with respect to payment.
Hypothesis 4: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will remain more
compliant after an income shock is experienced.

Supported?
Partial
Acceptance

Accepted

Rejected
Partial
Acceptance
Partial
Acceptance

The next four subsections provide the results for each hypothesis test. The results
to all the hypotheses are presented in
Table 11. The alpha protection levels for all results in the finding sections are
0.05.
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IX.3.1 Hypothesis 1
The hypothesis 1 states that, “Business owners within the higher tax liability
thresholds will have lower subscription to a safe harbor provision than business owners
within the lower tax liability thresholds.” The tests in this subsection will identify if there
is any statistical differences in the subscription rate between business owners randomly
assigned to high and low tax liability thresholds. The dependent variable for Hypothesis
1 is Subscription rate and the independent variable is tax liability thresholds.
(3)
where SR is the subscription rate to safe harbor provision and
LT (subscript) is the binary tax liability thresholds (low or high),
Formula 3 states that the subscription rate is expected to be greater for subjects
with low liability than for those subjects having higher tax liability thresholds.
As the results show on
Table 12, the subscription rate for the voluntary safe harbor participation was
large. The subscription rate dropped consistently from one round to the next for the high
tax threshold subjects, but it fluctuated for the low tax liability threshold. Nevertheless,
both high and low experienced an overall drop of roughly 10 percent (8.4 percent and
10.5 percent respectively).
Table 12: Safe Harbor Subscription Rate by Tax Liability Thresholds
Low

High

End of Round 3 Subscription Rate 94.3% (99/105) 90.0% (90/100)
End of Round 4 Subscription Rate 96.2% (101/105) 87.0% (87/100)
End of Round 5 Subscription Rate 86.7% (91/105) 81.0% (81/100)

The next four subsections focus on each round of non-parametric test results and
the ANOVA test.
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IX.3.1.1 Round 4 Test Results
Figure 10: Round 4 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate
Given Figure 10 shows the distribution of subscription to the safe harbor provision given
their employment tax liability threshold (Low versus High). As the picture shows, a
larger number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision. However, the
figure shows slightly higher subscription rate to the safe harbor provision for those
subjects who were randomly assigned to the lower tax liability threshold than those
subjects who were randomly assigned to the higher tax liability threshold. The statistical
tests for significance are shown below.

Figure 10: Round 4 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate
Given Employment Tax Liability Threshold
To determine the relationship between tax liability threshold and subscript on to a
safe harbor provision in the fourth round, two similar nonparametric tests were used41:
the Fisher Exact test and the Pearson’s Chi-Square (χ2). The Fisher Exact test is a χ2 that
examines the relationship between the two dimensions. This test results are found on
Table 13. The hypothesis is:

41

Both test were run because there was a low number participants who were audited because of the high
level of safe harbor provision subscription. The non-parametric tests were better fit for this scenario than
ANOVA.
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Ho: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are independent in the 4th
round.
Ha: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are not independent in the
4th round.
The Fisher Exact test p-value is 0.189, so the null hypothesis was not rejected.
These results confirm that there is no association between tax liability threshold
and subscription to safe harbor provision. This conclusion is further collaborated by the
Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.253), which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis and
conclude that compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. The results confirm higher tax
liability thresholds may not lead to higher subscription to safe harbor provision the fourth
round.
Table 13: Hypothesis 1 Round 4 Statistical Tests

Pearson’s χ2
Continuity Correction b
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value

df

1.307 a
0.780
1.317

1
1
1

1.301

1

Asymp. pvalue (2sided)
0.253
0.377
0.251
0.254

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Furthermore,

Exact pvalue (2sided)

Exact pvalue (1sided)

0.303

0.189
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Table 14 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2. The results
found an η of 0.080 and an η2 of 0.006. Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio,
2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and subscription to the
safe harbor provision. This implies that the employment tax liability threshold had a
small effect on subscription rate in the fourth round. These results are in line with the Phi
and Cramer’s V test results, which show a small effect. However, since the results were
not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.19. Therefore, we cannot
generalize these results to the population.
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Table 14: Hypothesis 1 Round 4 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.080
-0.080
0.080

0.253
0.253

IX.3.1.2 Round 5 Test Results

Figure 11 shows the distribution of subscription to the safe harbor provision given
their employment tax liability threshold (Low versus High). As the picture shows, the
results are similar to those in round 4. There were a larger number of subscriptions to the
safe harbor provision and higher subscription rate for subjects assigned lower tax liability
threshold than those subjects assigned to the higher tax liability threshold than with the
other two rounds observed. The statistical tests for significance are shown below.
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Figure 11: Round 5 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate
given Employment Tax Liability Threshold
To determine the relationship between the tax liability threshold and subscription
to a safe harbor provision in the fifth round, the same two nonparametric tests were used
(Fisher Exact Test and Pearson’s χ2). The hypothesis is provided below and results are
provided on Table 15.
Ho: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are independent in the
5th round.
Ha: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are not independent in the
5th round.
The Fisher Exact test p-value was 0.015. From this result, the null hypothesis is
rejected, confirming that there is association between the tax liability threshold and
subscription to a safe harbor provision in the fifth round. These results confirm that low
tax liability thresholds subjects subscribed to the safe harbor in higher statistical numbers
by high liability threshold subjects. This conclusion is further collaborated by the
Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.017), which shows that we can reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that tax liability threshold and subscription to the safe harbor provision are
related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level in the fifth round .
The results confirm higher tax liability thresholds may lead to higher subscription to safe
harbor provision the fifth round.
Table 15: Hypothesis 1 Round 5 Statistical Tests

Pearson’s χ2
Continuity Correction b

Value

df

Asymp. pvalue (2sided)

5.689 a
4.544

1
1

0.017
0.033

Exact pvalue (2sided)

Exact pvalue (1sided)
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5.938

Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

1

0.015
0.022

5.661

1

0.015

0.017

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.29.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Furthermore, Table 16 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.167 and an η2 of 0.027. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results showed a very small effect size between
employment tax liability threshold and subscription to the safe harbor provision. This
implies that the employment tax liability threshold had a small effect on the safe harbor
provision subscription rate during the fifth round. These results are in line with the Phi
and Cramer’s V test results, which are statically significant at the community-standard 5
percent alpha protection level.
Table 16: Hypothesis 1 Round 5 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.167
-0.167
0.167

0.017
0.017

IX.3.1.3 Round 6 Test Results
Figure 12 shows the distribution of subscription to the safe harbor provision given
their employment tax liability threshold (Low versus High). As the picture shows, the
results are similar to rounds 4 and 5. However, there is a lower subscription rate for this
round that the other rounds (in absolute terms), and a larger jump in the low tax liability
threshold. The statistical tests for significance are shown below.
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Figure 12: Round 6 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate
given Employment Tax Liability Threshold.

To determine the relationship between tax liability threshold and subscript on to
safe harbor provision in the sixth round, the same two nonparametric tests were used
(Fisher Exact Test and Pearson’s χ2). The hypothesis is provided below and results are
provided on Table 17.
Ho: The tax liability threshold and subscription to safe harbor provision are
independent in the 6th round.
Ha: The tax liability threshold and subscription to safe harbor provision are not
independent in the 6th round.
The Fisher Exact test p-value is 0.181, so the null hypothesis is not rejected.
These results confirm there is no association between tax liability threshold and
subscription to safe harbor provision. This conclusion is further collaborated by the
Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.270), which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis and
conclude that compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. The results confirm higher tax
liability thresholds may not lead to higher subscription to safe harbor provision the sixth
round.
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Table 17: Hypothesis 1 Round 6 Statistical Tests

Pearson’s χ2
Continuity Correction b
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value

df

Asymp. pvalue (2sided)

1.218 a
0.834
1.220

1
1
1

0.270
0.361
0.269

1.212

1

Exact pvalue (2sided)

Exact pvalue (1sided)

0.342

0.181

0.271

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.10.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Furthermore, Table 18 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.077 and an η2 of 0.006. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a very small effect size between compliance
and subscription to the safe harbor provision. These results are also in line with the Phi
and Cramer’s V test results. The results would imply payment compliance had a small
effect on the safe harbor subscription rate the sixth round. However, since the results
were not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level,
we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above
0.8. In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.20. Therefore, we
cannot generalize these results to the population.
Table 18: Hypothesis 1 Round 6 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.077
-0.077
0.077

0.270
0.270
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IX.3.1.4 Hypothesis 1 ANOVA Test Results
An ANOVA test was also run as indicated in the methods section. The ANOVA
test evaluates the mean difference between employment tax liability threshold and
subscription to the safe harbor provision. Table 19 shows the results of the test. The pvalue results for rounds 4 and 6 were greater than 0.05, but they were less than 0.05 for
round 5. Thus, the results confirm no dependency between the safe harbor subscription
rate and the liability threshold subjects (high or low) for the fourth and sixth round.
However, there was a mean difference in the safe harbor subscription rate between high
and low tax liability threshold subjects in the fifth round, which confirm dependency
between the safe harbor subscription rate and the liability threshold subjects (high or low)
in the fifth round.

Table 19: Hypothesis 1 ANOVA tests for
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

0.094
0.433
0.005

1
1
1

0.094
0.043
0.005

1.303
5.794
0.021

0.255
0.017
0.884

IX.3.2 Hypothesis 2a
Hypothesis 2a sets out to determine whether Business owners who experience
enforcement will have higher subscription rate to a safe harbor provision than those who
do not experience enforcement. This section is also segmented into four areas of results
based on each round of tests and ANOVA analysis.
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the
subscription rate and the number of enforcement treatments. The dependent variable for
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Hypothesis 2a is once more the subscription rate, but the independent variable is the
number of enforcement treatments under gone during the experiment.
(4)
where SR is the safe harbor subscription rate and
ET is the number of enforcement treatments.
Formula 4 states that the subscription rate is expected to improve as subject
encounter higher levels of enforcement.
Table 20 shows the distribution of enforcement treatments during the experiment
and a comparison to the expected enforcement rate calculated prior to the experiment.
The percent shown in this table can be used as the probability of enforcement as
described in Section 8.1.5 (page 45). The table shows a higher number of not selected
and “1 enforcement encounter” than previously expected. This shows that participants
subscribed to the safe harbor provision at a higher rate than anticipated in the design.
Table 20: Enforcement Treatments Frequency and Percent
Number of Enforcement
Treatments
No treatment
1 treatment
2 treatments
3 treatments
4 treatments

Frequency

Probability

49
96
56
4
0

23.9%
46.8%
27.3%
2.0%
0%

Expected
Probability
15.6%
31.3%
31.3%
15.6%
6.2%

IX.3.2.1 Round 4 Test Results
Figure 13 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to the safe
harbor provision given the number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments). As
the picture shows, a larger number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision.
The figure also shows similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not
subscribed), and a high number of subscriptions to the safe harbor provision for those
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who experienced the higher enforcement treatments. The statistical tests for significance
are shown below.

Figure 13: Round 4 Distributions between Enforcements Treatments and the Safe
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate.
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and subscription to a safe
harbor provision in the fourth round, a Pearson’s χ2 was run. Since the dependent
variable is categorical and not binary, the Fisher Exact test was not run for this
hypothesis. The results are shown on
Table 21.
Ho: Safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are
independent in the fourth round.
Ha: Safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are not
independent in the fourth round.
A Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was 0.012, which shows that we can reject
the null hypothesis confirming that there is association between enforcement treatments
and subscription to the safe harbor provision. This confirms that enforcement treatments
and subscription to the safe harbor provision are related at the community-standard 5
percent alpha protection level. These results confirm that a higher number of
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enforcement treatments may lead to higher subscription to the safe harbor provision in
the fourth round.
Table 21: Hypothesis 2a Round 4 Statistical Tests
Test
Pearson’s χ2
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association

Value

df

Asymp. p-value
(2-sided)

10.913 a
6.182
2.690

3
3
1

0.012
0.103
0.101

a. 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .31

As with the prior hypothesis, an effect size test was conducted. Table 22 shows
the results from an effect size analysis using η2. The results found an η of 0.231 and an
η2 of 0.053. Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a
small effect size between enforcement treatments and subscription to the safe harbor
provision. This implies that the enforcement treatments had a small effect on the safe
harbor provision subscription rates the fourth round. These results are in line with the Phi
and Cramer’s V test results, which are statically significant at the community-standard 5
percent alpha protection level.
Table 22: Hypothesis 2a Round 4 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

IX.3.2.2 Round 5 Test Results

Value

Approx. p-value

0.231
0.231
0.231

0.012
0.012
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Figure 14 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor
provision given the number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments). The results
in this round are similar to those in round 4 and 6. Some of the similarities are larger
number of participants who subscribed to the safe harbor provision, and similar
distributions for within groups (subscribed and not subscribed). However, in this round,
those individuals who experienced more than 3 enforcement treatments did not overly
subscribe to the safe harbor provision, which contradicts expectations. The statistical
tests for significance are shown below.

Figure 14: Round 5 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and the Safe
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate.
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To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and subscription to a safe
harbor provision in the fifth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run, and results are show on
Table 23.
Ho: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are
independent in the fifth round.
Ha: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are
not independent in the fifth round.
As mentioned before, The Fisher Exact test was not run. On the other hand, the
Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was 0.000, which shows that we must reject the null
hypothesis confirming that there is association between enforcement treatments and
subscription to the safe harbor provision. This confirms that enforcement treatments and
subscription to the safe harbor provision are related at the community-standard 5 percent
alpha protection level. The results confirm that a higher number of enforcement
treatments may lead to higher subscription to the safe harbor provision in the fifth round.
Table 23: Hypothesis 2a Round 5 Statistical Tests
Test
Pearson’s χ2
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association

Value

df

Asymp. p-value
(2-sided)

47.167 a
23.497
4.981

3
3
1

0.000
0.000
0.026

a. 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .33

Furthermore, Table 24 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.480 and an η2 of 0.230. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a moderate effect size between enforcement
treatments and subscription to the safe harbor provision. This implies that the
enforcement treatments had a moderate effect on safe harbor subscription rates the fifth
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round. These results are in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results, which are
statically significant at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.
Table 24: Hypothesis 2a Round 5 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.480
0.480
0.480

0.000
0.000

IX.3.2.3 Round 6 Test Results
Figure 15 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor
provision given the number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments). The results
in this round are similar to those in round 4 and 5:




Larger number of them subscribed to the safe harbor provision
Similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed). The
statistical tests for significance are shown below.
Higher subscription to the safe harbor provision for those who experienced higher
enforcement treatments.

Figure 15: Round 6 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and the Safe
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate.
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and subscription to a safe
harbor provision in the sixth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run and the results are shown on
Table 25.
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Ho: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are
independent in the sixth round.
Ha: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are
not independent in the sixth round.
As mentioned before, the dependent variable is not a binary variable and the
Fisher Exact test was not run. The results from the Pearson’s χ2 found a p-value was
0.009 in the sixth round, which shows that we can reject the null hypothesis confirming
that there is association between enforcement treatments and subscription to the safe
harbor provision. This confirms that enforcement treatments and subscription to the safe
harbor provision are related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.
The results confirm that a higher the number of enforcement treatments may lead to
higher subscription to the safe harbor provision in the sixth round.
Table 25: Hypothesis 2a Round 6 Statistical Tests
Test
Pearson’s χ2
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association

Value

df

Asymp. p-value (2sided)

11.680 a
8.367
4.529

3
3
1

0.009
0.039
0.033

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64

Furthermore, Table 26 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.239 and an η2 of 0.057. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between enforcement
treatments and subscription to the safe harbor provision. This implies that the
enforcement treatments had a small effect on the safe harbor subscription rates in the
sixth round. These results are in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results, which are
statically significant at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.
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Although the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community
protection level, we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the
statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was
0.94. Therefore, we can generalize these results to the population.
Table 26: Hypothesis 2a Round 6 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.239
0.239
0.239

0.009
0.009

IX.3.2.4 Hypothesis 2a ANOVA Test Results
An ANOVA test was run as planned in the proposal. The ANOVA test evaluates
the mean difference between the safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement
treatments.
Table 27 shows, all the p-values were below the community-standard 5 percent
alpha protection level. The results confirm a dependency between the safe harbor
subscription rate and the number of enforcement treatments (i.e., 1- 4). Since the number
of enforcements had an impact on the safe harbor subscription rate, this corroborates with
the idea that subjects with higher enforcement treatments would be more likely to
subscribe to the safe harbor provision.
Table 27: Hypothesis 2a ANOVA tests
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

0.785
3.587
1.577

3
3
3

0.262
1.196
0.526

3.767
20.022
4.048

0.012
0.000
0.008
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IX.3.3 Hypothesis 2b
Hypothesis 2b sets out to determine whether business owners who experience
enforcement will have higher payment compliance rate than those who do not experience
enforcement. This section is also segmented into four areas of results based on each
round of tests and ANOVA analysis.
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the
employment tax payment compliance and the number of enforcement treatments. The
dependent variable for Hypothesis 2b is employment tax payment compliance, and the
independent variable is the number of enforcement treatments undergone during the
experiment.

(5)
Where PMT is employment tax payment compliance category
EE is the number of enforcement treatments
Formula 5 states that the employment tax payment compliance category is
expected to improve as subject encounter higher levels of enforcement. Employment tax
payment compliance category is a binary variable and it was calculated in two steps.
First, the difference between expected payment and actual payment was calculated.
Using the results from this step, a binary variable was compute suing the following
formula:
If Actual payment – Expected payment ≥ 0 → Compliant
If Actual payment – Expected payment < 0 → Non-Compliant
These computations were used for every round and throughout all analysis of
payment compliance.
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IX.3.3.1 Round 4 Test Results
Figure 16 shows the distribution of subjects’ propensity to comply given the
number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments). As the picture shows, a larger
number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision. The figure also shows
similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed), but the figure
shows a higher rate of payment compliance for those who experience an enforcement
encounter. The statistical tests for significance are shown below.

Figure 16: Round 4 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and Payment
Compliance Rate.
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and payment compliance in
the fourth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run. Since the dependent variable is categorical
and not binary, the Fisher Exact test was not run for this hypothesis.
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are
independent in the fourth round.
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are not
independent in the fourth round.
The results are shown on Table 28. The Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was
0.075, which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis confirming that there is no
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association between enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance.
This confirms that enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance are
not related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. The results
confirm that a higher the number of enforcement treatments may not lead to higher
payment compliance in the fourth round.
Table 28: Hypothesis 2b Round 4 Statistical Tests
Test
Pearson’s χ2
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association

Value

df

Asymp. p-value
(2-sided)

6.918 a
6.878
0.297

3
3
1

0.075
0.076
0.585

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.58

As with the prior hypothesis, an effect size test was conducted. Table 29 shows
the results from an effect size analysis using η2. The results found an η of 0.184 and an
η2 of 0.033. Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a
small effect size between enforcement treatments and payment compliance. These results
are also in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results. The results would imply
enforcement treatments had a small effect on payment compliance rate the fourth round.
However, since the results were not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific
community protection level, we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if
the statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power
was 0.76. Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the population.
Table 29: Hypothesis 2b Round 4 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.184
0. 184
0. 184

0.075
0.075
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IX.3.3.2 Round 5 Test Results
Figure 17 shows the distribution of subjects’ propensity to comply given the
number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments). As the picture shows, a larger
number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision. The figure also shows
similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed). Unlike the previous
round, the figure shows a similar rate of payment compliance given the number of
enforcement treatments. The statistical tests for significance are shown below.

Figure 17: Round 5 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and Payment
Compliance Rate.
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and payment compliance in
the fifth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run and the results are shown on Table 30. Since the
dependent variable is categorical and not binary, the Fisher Exact test was not run.
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are
independent in the fifth round.
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are not
independent in the fifth round.
The Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was 0.437, which shows that we can
accept the null hypothesis confirming that there is no association between enforcement
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treatments and employment tax payment compliance. This confirms that enforcement
treatments and payment compliance are not related at the community-standard 5 percent
alpha protection level. The results confirm that a higher the number of enforcement
treatments may not lead to higher payment compliance in the fifth round.

Table 30: Hypothesis 2b Round 5 Statistical Tests
Value

df

Asymp. p-value
(2-sided)

2.720 a
2.686
.600

3
3
1

0.437
0.443
0.439

Test
Pearson’s χ2
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.56

Table 31 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2. The results
found an η of 0.115 and an η2 of 0.013. Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio,
2008), the results show a small effect size between enforcement encounter and payment
compliance. These results are also in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results. The
results would imply enforcement treatments had a small effect on payment compliance
rate the fifth round. However, since the results were not statistically significant at the
0.05 alpha scientific community protection levels, we can only generalize these effect
sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated
post-hoc statistical power was 0.38. Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the
population.
Table 31: Hypothesis 2b Round 5 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.115
0.115
0.115

0.437
0.437
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IX.3.3.3 Round 6 Test Results

Figure 18 shows the distribution of subjects’ propensity to comply given the
number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments). As the picture shows, a larger
number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision. The figure also shows
similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed). Unlike the previous
round, the figure shows a similar payment compliance given the number of enforcement
treatments. The statistical tests for significance are shown below.

Figure 18: Round 6 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and Payment
Compliance Rate.
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and payment compliance in
the sixth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run. Again, the Fisher Exact test was not run.
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Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are
independent in the fifth round.
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are not
independent in the fifth round.
The results are provided on Table 32. The Pearson’s χ2 the p-value was 0.863,
which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis confirming that there is no
association between enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance.
This confirms that that enforcement treatments and payment compliance are not related at
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. The results confirm that a
higher the number of enforcement treatments may not lead to higher payment compliance
in the sixth round.
Table 32: Hypothesis 2b Round 6 Statistical Tests
Test
Pearson’s χ2
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association

Value

df

Asymp. p-value
(2-sided)

0.742 a
0.743
0.559

3
3
1

0.863
0.863
0.455

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.89

Table 33 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2. The results
found an η of 0.060 and an η2 of 0.003. Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio,
2008), the results show a small effect size between payment compliance and enforcement
treatments. These results are also in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results. The
results would imply enforcement treatments had a small effect on payment compliance
rate the sixth round. However, since the results were not statistically significant at the
0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can only generalize these effect
sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated
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post-hoc statistical power was 0.11. Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the
population.
Table 33: Hypothesis 2b Round 6 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.060
0.060
0.060

0.863
0.863

IX.3.3.4 Hypothesis 2b ANOVA Test Results
An ANOVA test was run for this hypothesis. The ANOVA test evaluates the
mean difference between employment tax payment compliance and the number of
enforcement treatments. As shown
Table 34, the p-values were greater than the community-standard 5 percent alpha
protection level. Therefore, results confirm no dependency between the number of
enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance.
Table 34: ANOVA tests for Hypothesis 2b
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

1.653
0.647
0.185

3
3
3

0.551
0.216
0.062

2.340
0.901
0.243

0.075
0.442
0.866

IX.3.4 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 sets out to determine whether business owners who chose a safe
harbor provision will be more compliant, with respect to payment compliance. This
section is segmented into three areas of results each one is focused on each round of
testing.
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the
employment tax payment compliance and the number of enforcement treatments. The
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dependent variable for Hypothesis 3 is employment tax payment compliance, and the
independent variable is subscription to the safe harbor provision.
(6)
Where PMT is the employment tax payment compliance
SR is the subscription to the safe harbor provision
Formula 6 states that the employment tax payment compliance should be higher
for those subjects who subscribe to the safe harbor provision than for subjects who do
not.
Table 35 shows a sizable increase (about 10 percent) in the payment compliance
rate once a safe harbor provision becomes an available choice. It also shows an
improvement of approximately four percent in compliance as subjects undergo
enforcement treatments (i.e. round 3). In the last round, we see a decrease in compliance
when the income shock takes place.
Table 35: Compliance and Noncompliance Rate by Rounds
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

Compliant

Non-Compliant

49.3%
48.8%
51.2%
60.5%
61.0%
52.7%

50.7%
51.2%
48.8%
39.5%
39.0%
47.3%

Table is similar to Table 45

IX.3.4.1 Round 4 Testing
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Figure 19 shows the distribution of payment compliance given the subscription to
a safe harbor. As the picture shows, a larger number of subjects subscribed to the safe
harbor provision. However, the figure shows slightly greater payment compliance for
those subscribed to the safe harbor provision than for those who did not subscribe to the
provision. The statistical tests for significance are shown below.

Figure 19: Round 4 Distributions between Payment Compliance and the Safe
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate.
To determine the relationship payment compliance and subscription to a safe
harbor provision in the fourth round, Fisher Exact test and Pearson’s χ2 were used. The
results are show on.
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision are independent in the fourth round.
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Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision are not independent in the fourth round.
The Fisher Exact test was not statistically significant (p-value of 0.124), so the
null hypothesis is not rejected. The results confirm that there is no association between
employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe harbor provision.
This conclusion is further collaborated by the Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.154), which
shows that we can accept the null hypothesis and conclude that compliance and
subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at the community-standard 5
percent alpha protection level. The results confirm that subscribing to safe harbor may
not lead to higher employment tax payment compliance in the fourth round.

Table 36: Hypothesis 3 Round 4 Statistical Tests
Test
Pearson’s χ2
Continuity Correction b
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value

df

Asymp. pvalue (2sided)

2.034a
1.346
1.982

1
1
1

0.154
0.246
0.159

2.024

1

Exact pvalue (2sided)

Exact pvalue (1sided)

0.186

0.124

0.155

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.32.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Furthermore, Table 37 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.100 and an η2 of 0.01. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and
subscription to the safe harbor provision. These results are also in line with the Phi and
Cramer’s V test results. The results would imply the safe harbor subscription had a small
effect on payment compliance rate the fourth round. However, since the results were not
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statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.30. Therefore, we cannot
generalize these results to the population.
Table 37: Hypothesis 3 Round 4 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.100
0.100
0.100

0.154
0.154

IX.3.4.2 Round 5
Figure 20 shows the distribution of subjects’ payment compliance given their
subscription to the safe harbor provision. As the picture shows, a larger number of
subjects subscribed to the safe harbor provision, and the figure shows slightly greater
payment compliance for those subscribed to the safe harbor provision than those who did
not subscribe to the provision (as in round 4). The statistical tests for significance are
shown below.
Figure 20: Round 5 Distributions between Payment Compliance and the Safe
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate.
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Fisher Exact Test and Pearson’s χ2 tests were used to determine the relationship
payment compliance and subscription to a safe harbor provision in the fifth round, and
results are show on Table 38.
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision are independent in the fifth round.
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision are not independent in the fifth round.
The Fisher Exact test p-value was 0.166, so the null hypothesis is not rejected.
The results confirm that there is no association between employment tax payment
compliance and the subscription to the safe harbor provision. This conclusion is further
collaborated by the Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.219), which shows that we accept the null
hypothesis and conclude that employment tax payment compliance and subscription to
the safe harbor provision are not related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha
protection level. The results confirm that subscribing to safe harbor may not lead to
higher employment tax payment compliance in the fifth round.
Table 38: Hypothesis 3 Round 5 Statistical Tests
Test
Pearson’s χ2
Continuity Correction b
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value

df

Asymp. p-value
(2-sided)

1.509 a
0.938
1.470

1
1
1

0.154
0.333
0.225

1.501

1

0.220

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.63.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Exact pvalue (2sided)

Exact pvalue (1sided)

0.299

0.166
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Furthermore, Table 39 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.086 and an η2 of 0.007. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and
subscription to the safe harbor provision. These results are also in line with the Phi and
Cramer’s V test results. The results would imply a safe harbor subscription had a small
effect on payment compliance rate the fifth round. However, since the results were not
statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.22. Therefore, we cannot
generalize these results to the population.
Table 39: Hypothesis 3 Round 5 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.086
0.086
0.086

0.219
0.219

IX.3.4.3 Round 6
Figure 21 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor
and their payment compliance. As the picture shows, a larger number of subjects
subscribed to the safe harbor provision. However, the figure does not shows much
difference in payment compliance for those subscribed to the safe harbor provision than
those subjects who did not subscribed to the safe harbor provision. This is a departure
from rounds 4 and 5. The statistical tests for significance are shown below.
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Figure 21: Round 6 Distributions between Compliance Payment and the Safe
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate.

On Table 40 the results for this round are provided and it tests the relationship
between payment compliance and subscription to a safe harbor provision in the sixth
round.
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision are independent in the sixth round.
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision are not independent in the sixth round.
The Fisher Exact test p-value was 0.516 accepting the null hypothesis. Therefore,
there is no association between employment tax payment compliance and subscription to
the safe harbor provision in the sixth round. This conclusion is further collaborated by
the Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.883), which shows that we accept the null hypothesis and
conclude that compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. The results confirm that
subscription to the safe harbor provision may not lead to higher employment tax payment
compliance in the sixth round.
Table 40: Hypothesis 3 Round 6 Statistical Tests
Test

Value

df

Asymp. p-

Exact p-

Exact p-
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value (2sided)
Pearson’s χ2
Continuity Correction b
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

0.022 a
0.000
0.022

0.021

1
1
1

1

value (2sided)

value (1sided)

1.000

0.516

0.883
1.000
0.883

0.884

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is15.61.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Furthermore, Table 41 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.010 and an η2 of 0.000. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and
subscription to the safe harbor provision. These results are also in line with the Phi and
Cramer’s V test results. The results would imply the safe harbor subscription had a small
effect on payment compliance rate the sixth round. However, since the results were not
statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.04. Therefore, we cannot
generalize these results to the population.
Table 41: Hypothesis 3 Round 5 Effect Size Tests
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.010
0.010
0.010

0.883
0.883

IX.3.4.4 Hypothesis 3 ANOVA test
An ANOVA test was run for this hypothesis. The ANOVA test evaluates the
mean difference between employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to
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the safe harbor provision. As shown on Table 42, all the p-values were greater than the
community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. This confirms that there was no
dependency between payment compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision
(i.e., subscribed and not subscribed). These results found not difference in the
employment tax payment compliance for those who subscribe or did not subscribe.
These results may be attributed to two events: 1) most of the subjects subscribed to the
safe harbor and 2) overall employment tax payment compliance improved once
subscription became available.42
Table 42: Hypothesis 3ANOVA Tests
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

0.486
0.359
0.005

1
1
1

0.486
0.359
0.005

2.035
1.505
0.021

0.155
0.221
0.884

IX.3.5 Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 sets out to determine whether a business owner who chose a safe
harbor provision will remain more compliant after an income shock43 is experienced. In
this section, we built up on the results obtained in the Section 9.3.4: Hypothesis 3.
However, in this section, a ratio variable was used as the dependent variable and binary
variable remained as the independent variable.
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the
employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to a safe harbor provision
given an income shock. The dependent variable for Hypothesis 4 was employment tax

42

The safe harbor subscription rate is discussed in Section IX.3.1and in Section IX.3.4. The improvement
in employment tax payment compliance is discussed in Section IX.3.6
43
Income shock is define as a 50 percent drop in firm revenue
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payment compliance and the independent variable is subscription to the safe harbor
provision given the introduction of an income shock.
(7)
Where PMT is the employment tax payment compliance category
SR is the subscription to the safe harbor provision
I is the income shock imposed on round 6
Formula 7 states that the employment tax payment compliance should be higher
for those subjects who subscribe to the safe harbor provision than for subjects who do not
subscribe even during an income shock.
Figure 22 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor
and their payment compliance. As the picture shows, a larger number of subjects
subscribed to the safe harbor provision. However, the figure does not shows much
difference in payment compliance for those subscribed to the safe harbor provision and
those subjects who did not subscribed to the safe harbor provision.

Figure 22: Round 6 Distributions between Payment Compliance and the Safe
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate.

To determine the relationship between employment tax payment compliance and
subscription to a safe harbor provision after the income shock is applied, a Pearson’s χ2
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was run and the results are show on Table 43. Because of the data classification, the
Fisher Exact test was not run.
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision given the income shock are independent in the sixth round.
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe
harbor provision given the income shock are not independent in the sixth round.
The Pearson’s χ2 the p-value was 0.883, which shows that we must accept the null
hypothesis confirming that there is no association between employment tax payment
compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision once the income shock is
applied. This confirms that enforcement treatments and payment compliance are not
related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. The results confirm
that subscribing to safe harbor during and income shock may not lead to higher payment
compliance.
Table 43: Hypothesis 4 Statistical Tests
Test

Value

df

Asymp. p-value
(2-sided)

Pearson’s χ2
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association

68.543a
69.431
0.177

76
76
1

0.716
0.690
0.674

a. 150 cells (97.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.16.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Furthermore, Table 44 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.578 and an η2 of 0.334. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a moderate effect size between compliance
and subscription to the safe harbor provision. These results are also in line with the Phi
and Cramer’s V test results. The results would imply the safe harbor subscription had a
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moderate effect on payment compliance rate the sixth round. However, since the results
were not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level,
we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above
0.8. In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 1.00. Therefore, we can
generalize these results to the population.
Table 44: Hypothesis 4 Effect Size Test
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.578
0.578
0.578

0.716
0.716

IX.3.5.1 Hypothesis 4 ANOVA test
An ANOVA test was run for this hypothesis. The ANOVA test evaluates the
mean difference between employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to
the safe harbor provision given an income shock. As Table 45 show, all the p-values
were greater than the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. This
confirms that there was no dependency between payment compliance and subscription to
the safe harbor provision.
Table 45: Round 6 ANOVA Test
Round 6

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

0.005

1

0.005

0.021

0.675

The results in hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 are similar, but required additional
testing.
IX.3.6 Additional Payment Compliance Analysis
The payment compliance rate for rounds one through six are provided on Table
46. The information for round one through three provides the propensity to underpay.
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The payment compliance rate for rounds four through six provided a compliance
propensity for subjects under the safe harbor provision. In general, the compliance
increased for those rounds under the safe harbor provision.
Table 46: Payment Compliance frequency by Round
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

Compliance

Non-compliance

Compliance Rate

101
100
105
124
125
108

104
105
100
81
80
97

49.3
48.8
51.2
60.5
61.0
52.7

Table similar to Table 34

IX.3.6.1 Payment Compliance ANOVA
An index was created to identify the compliance rate before and after the safe
harbor subscription provision was permitted. Using ANOVA test, we tested to see if the
propensity to comply had changed under the safe harbor provision. The results are
provided on Table 47 and they found statistical significance at 5%. This means that the
p-value was less than the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. This
confirms that there was dependency between payment compliance and subscription to the
safe harbor provision.
Table 47: ANOVA Test between Compliance Rates under the Safe Harbor
Provision
Between groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p-value

11.738
20.184
31.922

3
201
204

3.913
0.100

38.962

0.000

Furthermore, Table 48 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.
The results found an η of 0.606 and an η2 of 0.368. Using Cohen’s interpretation
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a moderate effect size between compliance
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and subscription to the safe harbor provision. These results are also in line with the Phi
and Cramer’s V test results. The results would imply the safe harbor provision had a
moderate effect on payment compliance rate on the last three rounds. Since the results
were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level and
the statistical power is 1.00, we can generalize these results to the population.
Table 48: Compliance Rates under a Safe Harbor Provision Effect Size Test
Test
η
Phi
Cramer’s V

Value

Approx. p-value

0.606
0.647
0.373

0.000
0.000

IX.3.6.2 Logistic Regression Control Compliance
Using FA score obtained from both the Risk Components (see Table 10) a logistic
regression was ran to demine if risk control or speculative risk had any impact on
compliance or subscription rate. This is possible because our constructs were valid and
reliable. The four tables below show the results.
IX.3.6.2.1 Employment Tax Payment Compliance

Table 49 shows the payment compliance results obtained by running a logistic
regression model using the FA analysis scores as independent variables (risk control,
speculative risk and the interaction of risk control and speculative risk). Table 50
Provides the Nagelkerke R2 and the final omnibus model p-value. The model is
=

α + β1 (risk control) + β2 (speculative risk) +
β3 (risk control × speculative risk)
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Table 49: Payment Compliance logistic Regression Results Given Risk control
Compliance
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

B
-0.029
-0.049
0.049
0.426
0.446
0.107

S.E.
0.140
0.140
0.140
0.143
0.143
0.140

Wald
0.044
0.122
0.122
8.884
9.716
0.590

p-value
0.364
0.727
0.727
0.003a
0.002a
0.443

Odd Ratio
0.971
0.952
1.050
1.531
1.562
1.113

a. Model obtained statistically significant results for the constant (or y-intercept).

Table 50: Goodness of fit analysis
Test
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

p-value

Nagelkerke R2

0.746
0.875
0938
0.322
0.477
0.126

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

As the results from

Table 49 and Table 50 show, none of the dependent variables were statically
significant. Furthermore, the goodness of fit test showed that this model was not able to
explain any variation (R2 of 0.000). Therefore, risk controls (risk control or speculative
risk) did not have any influence payment compliance. On the other hand, the fourth and
fifth rounds were statistically significant and the odds ratio shows some effect on
payment compliance. However, since the results were not statistically significant at the
0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can only generalize these effect
sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated
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post-hoc statistical power was 0.04. Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the
population.
In addition to risk controls, further exploration was conducted to determine if in
fact payment compliance had improved by the implementation of the safe harbor
provision. Other logistic regression models were run to explore this premise.

Table 51 provides the results from the final logistic regression model:
=

α + β1 (Prior round compliance) + β2 (Tax liability threshold)
+ β3 (Availability to a safe harbor provision) + β4 (Income
shock) + β5 (enforcement treatments in the prior round)

=

–586 + 2.294(Prior round compliance) –1.289(Tax liability
threshold) + 0.460 (Availability to a safe harbor provision) –
0.603(Income shock) + 0.412(enforcement treatments in prior
round)

Table 51: Payment Compliance logistic Regression Results
Payment Compliance
Prior round compliance
Tax liability threshold
Availability to a safe harbor provision
Income Shock
Enforcement treatments in prior round
Constant

B
2.294
-1.289
.460
-.603
.412
-.586

S.E.
.166
.162
.177
.232
.200
.181

Wald
191.727
63.231
6.732
6.789
4.249
10.519

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.009
0.039
0.001

Table 52: Goodness of fit analysis
Pseudo R2

As the results from the

Cox & Snell R2

Nagelkerke R2

0.343

0.458

Odd Ratio
9.919
0.276
1.584
0.547
1.510
0.557
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Table 51 and Table 52 show, subjects who were compliant in prior round would
continue to maintain their compliant behavior. It also showed that payment compliance
decreases when the subject was assigned to the high tax liability threshold. This is in
accordance with the literature. The model also showed that when the safe harbor
provision is available, subjects are more likely comply with their payment obligations.
The model found that income shock and prior enforcement experience would reduce the
payment compliance of participants. Furthermore, the goodness of fit test showed that
this model was able to explain between 34 and 46 percent of the variation. The
classification table did show a classification prediction accuracy of 79.2 percent.
Since the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific
community protection level, we can generalize these effect sizes to the population if the
statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was
1.00. Therefore, we can generalize these results to the population.
IX.3.6.2.2 Subscription Rate
Table 53 shows the subscription results obtained from the logistic regression
model using FA analysis scores as independent variables (risk control, speculative risk
and the interaction of risk control and speculative risk). Table 54 Provides the
Nagelkerke R2 and the final omnibus model p-value.
= α + β1 (risk control) + β2 (speculative risk) + β3 (risk control ×
speculative risk)

Table 53: Payment Compliance logistic Regression Results Given Risk control
Compliance

Round 4

Risk Control a

Y-intercept

B
-0.490
2.574

S.E.
0.241
0.283

Wald
4.119
82.534

p-value
0.042
0.000

Odd Ratio
0.613
13.125

135

Round 5
Round 6

Risk Control

Y-intercept
Risk Control

Y-intercept

-0.460
2.495
-0.266
1.651

0.236
0.273
0.184
0.190

3.819
83.637
74.637
75.470

0.051
0.000
0.147
0.000

0.631
12.120
0.766
5.212

a. speculative risk and the interaction of risk control and speculative risk were not statistically significant.

Table 54: Goodness of fit analysis
Test
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6

p-value

Nagelkerke R2

0.046
0.054
0.000

0.046
0.041
0.000

As the results from Table 53 and Table 54 show, one of the dependent variables
(risk control) was statically significant. However, it was only significant at predicting
subscriptions rate in round 4, but not in the other two rounds. The goodness of fit test
showed that this model was not able to explain much of the variation, with an explain
variation of around 4 percent. The classification table did show a classification
prediction accuracy of 91.7 percent.
Although some of the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha
scientific community protection level, we can still generalize these effect sizes to the
population if the statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated post-hoc
statistical power was 0.742. Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the
population.
As with payment compliance, further logistics regressions were conducted to
determine which factors drove the subjects’ decision to subscribe to the safe harbor
provision. The final model was:
α + β1 (Prior round compliance) + β2 (prior round

=

enforcement encounter × availability of safe harbor)
+ β3 (Availability to a safe harbor provision × tax
liability threshold) + β4 (prior round compliance ×
tax liability threshold)
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–1.695 + 1.970 (Prior round compliance) + 1.748 (prior round
enforcement encounter × availability of safe harbor) + 3.512
(Availability to a safe harbor provision × tax liability threshold)
– 2.564 (prior round compliance × tax liability threshold)

Table 55: Subscription to Safe Harbor Regression Results
Payment Compliance

Prior round compliance
Interaction of prior round enforcement encounter
and availability of a safe harbor
Interaction of availability of a safe harbor and tax
liability threshold
Interaction of prior round compliance and tax
liability threshold
Constant

107.428

pvalue
0.000

Odd
Ratio
9.919

.319

29.942

0.000

0.276

.243

208.095

0.009

1.584

.306

70.058

0.009

0.547

.161

111.157

0.039

1.510

B

S.E.

Wald

1.970

.190

1.748
3.512
2.564
1.695

Table 56: Goodness of fit analysis
Pseudo R2

Cox & Snell R2

Nagelkerke R2

0.320

0.427

Table 55 and
Table 56 provide the results from the model. The results found subjects who were
compliant in prior rounds were almost 10 times more likely to subscribe to a safe harbor
provision. On the other, the results found that subjects who encounter enforcement in the
prior round were less likely to subscribe to a safe harbor provision once the provision
became available. The model results also found that higher tax liability threshold
subjects were more likely to subscribe to the safe harbor provision once it became
available. Lastly, the model showed that subject who were compliant and had a high tax
liability threshold were more likely to subscribe to the safe harbor provision.
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The goodness of fit test showed that this model was able to explain between 32
and 42 percent of the variation. The classification table did show a classification
prediction accuracy of 77.0 percent.
Since the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific
community protection level, we can generalize these effect sizes to the population if the
statistical power is above 0.8. In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was
1.00. Therefore, we can generalize these results to the population.
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X

DISCUSSION

X.1 Contribution to Theory
The theoretical motivation of this study is to enhance our understanding of
taxpayers’ antisocial behavior using General Deterrence Theory. Deterrence is the
impact that punishment has on those who have not committed a criminal act (Blumstein
et al., 1978). In terms of tax enforcement, deterrence is the impact tax audits and their
accompanying punishments, such as interest, penalties, and imprisonment, have on those
individuals who have failed to report and pay taxes their tax requirements.
The SMORC states that there are two methods to increase individuals’ marginal
cost: (1) higher probability of being apprehended and (2) increased magnitude of
punishment (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Ariely, 2012; Upadhyay, 2013). This study
has shown similar results. It showed that increased probability of apprehension leads to
increased compliance. Most importantly, this study has shown that individuals were
willing to subscribe in large numbers to a safe harbor provision that eliminate the
probability of apprehension in order to reduce their burden and avoid punishment
(audit/enforcement encounter and penalties related to audit results). Furthermore, this
study was able to show that individuals were willing to improve their compliance rate
when enforcement was increased as the literature had prescribed in other circumstances
(Alm et al., 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Kalplowitz, 1973; Lijiao et
al., 2014).
General Deterrence Theory provides an explanation as to how different levels of
punishment influence antisocial behavior. The general measurement of deterrence can
be achieved by calculating the change in criminal rates at different levels of punishment
(Blumstein et al., 1978). In this study a 10 percent improvement in compliance was
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achieved. This provides some evidence that General Deterrence Theory in fact reduced
the antisocial behavior associated with the employment tax payment compliance.
X.2 Contribution to Practice
The practical motivation was to improve the understanding of voluntary reporting
and payment of employment tax in the hopes of influence related IRS processing. The
results from this study suggest that provisions such as a safe harbor can be a method of
reducing filing costs and audit costs and ultimately taxpayer burden. On the other hand,
the results of this study were inconclusive in determining if such provisions can improve
payment compliance. Nevertheless, the outcome of this study can improve timing and
accuracy of employment taxes and it may improve the accuracy of employment tax
payment.
X.2.1 Employment Tax Motivation
The practical focus on employment tax was driven by the impact it has on the tax
gap, which accounts for an approximately 72 billion dollars (IRS, 2012b) loss to the US
government every year. The practical focus for using a safe harbor was based on the IRS
believes that improving voluntary compliance is necessary to reduce the tax gap (IRS,
2009). Given the complexity of the IRC and the IRS responsibility for ensuring that
taxpayers understand and meet their tax obligations, including filing and payment of
employment tax, this research results can assist the Service in improving their client’s tax
obligations and reducing taxpayer burden. This study set out to determine if a safe harbor
provision could minimize the employment tax filing burden and improve employment tax
payment compliance. As the results show, a safe harbor provisions can be a method for
reducing filing burden and potentially improve payment compliance.
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As the data in Table 1 suggested, third party matching already exists and filing
compliance is high. However, that does not reduce enforcement activities or the time it
takes to file the necessary Form 94X to comply with the payment of employment tax.
The results of this study show that a safe harbor provision would reduce the filing burden
and some enforcement activities related to employment tax filing. Furthermore, this
research shows potential opportunities in improving employment tax payment
compliance. The results show an increase of approximately 10 percent in payment
compliance during a safe harbor periods that did not encounter an income shock. This
shows that while a safe harbor provision will not prevent a subscriber from not
complying during difficult financial epochs, it does show that subjects are willing to
comply under normal circumstances. Therefore, this study has shown that tax authorities
can reduce taxpayer burden and can use such provisions to reduce failure-to-pay
employment tax.
X.2.2 Compliance Motivation
The practical focus on compliance is based on the premise that random audits lead
to better predictions of noncompliance (Bloomquist, 2009). However, the current IRS
state of smaller corporate audit coverage, current compliance identification methods, and
shrinking enforcement personnel budgets, there is a need to improve voluntary payment,
filing, and reporting compliance for employment tax. Furthermore, increasing deficits
put pressure on the IRS to enhance compliance.
Although this study would not improve the NRP model used for predicting
compliance, future studies could improve how or when the IRS conducts physical audit.
Since subscribers of a safe harbor provision are more likely to be compliant and a large
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number of subjects were willing to subscribe to a safe harbor provision, the IRS could
substantially reduce the number of Revenue Agents (RAs) it uses to conduct field audits.
The importance of this narrower focus study is because physical audits are costly and IRS
budgets are shrinking.
Because of long running deficits, the IRS began identifying ways to reduce the tax
gap (Brown & Mazur, 2003; Holland, 1958; IRS, 1996). After the great recession of
2008 the IRS instituted initiatives to curtail the $72 billion tax gap from employment tax
(IRS, 2009). This study is in line with the IRS’s initiative to revising the collection due
process for employment taxes and studying employment tax reporting and filing
compliance (IRS, 2009).
This research study provides ways to simplify the filing and payment process
associated with the employment tax and it shows a statistical improvement on the current
process. This study builds on the simplification of employment tax payment, which
Bloomquist (2003b) states could lead to increased compliance.
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XI LIMITATIONS
The design used has great internal validity. However, the external validity for this
type of design is not sufficient to infer to the greater population. One of the major
reasons is the inability to determine the presence of non-response bias and the ability to
randomly select subjects from the population. Therefore, inference to the subjects who
undertook this experiment is possible, but not to the population. In future research,
obtaining from the IRS a sample from the population of employers who actually pay
employment tax to randomly select participants would be helpful in overcoming this
limitation, and this could result in different conclusions.
Another limitation of this design can be the lack of realism that the web-based
experiment may exhibit, which may lead to behaviors not observed in the naturally
occurring world. Lastly, this study was a web-based experiment and there is a valid
criticism as to its rigor. A major criticism is the ability for subjects to drop out of the
experiment because it is easier to end a web based experiment than walking out of a
laboratory experiment (Wade & Tingling, 2005). Another critic is that only those with
web access are able to access the experiment. Nevertheless, Wade and Tingling (2005)
do suggest that web experiments can be effective with “internal validity, volunteer bias,
demand characteristics, external validity, financial cost and time” (pg. 81). To overcome
this design limitation, a similar experiment could be augmented using lab and web
subjects to compare and verify results. A more robust study would include a pilot using a
sample form the actual population, where results could be compared to the control group
not selected in the pilot.
During the completion of the experiment, subjects were instructed to identify how
much employment tax withholding they needed to pay. However, about 20 percent of all
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participants paid only the employer’s (or employee) portion of the employment tax
payment. It is possible that even though the instructions stated they needed to pay both
employer and employee’s portion, some subjects only paid the employer’s portion
without noticing that they had to pay both. Since there was not interaction between the
student PI and the subjects, it is impossible to identify if this was done on purpose or if it
was an oversight. On the other hand, if individuals who encounter enforcement had been
subject to some additional educational information, it is possible that the hypothesis 3 and
4 results would have been quite different. This limitation suggests future research design
changes, naturally.
Carryover effect (learning effect, or order effect) was another design limitation.
Carryover affect occurs when experiment subject have undergone the same task or
scenario a number of times, and subjects either become better through practice or become
worse through fatigue. Since the experiment did not randomly assign the income shock
through different rounds of the experiment, the study results cannot separate if the results
are due to the introduction of the treatment (income shock) or if subjects were simply
learning how to respond to the experiment. To resolve this limitation, future studies
could use counterbalancing techniques. Future studies could implement randomize order
of the income shock treatment variables as used in Kalambokidis et al. (2012).
Lastly, payment of participants is a limitation on the design. Since the
participants were all paid the same amount regardless of their selection, participants did
not have an economic incentive to maximize their payoffs. This limits the ability to
identify whether or not subjects reacted to economic incentive. Future studies could use
true economic penalties for incorrectly paying or filing their taxes during the experiment
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by reducing economic payout (i.e., pay less to those who are found noncompliant).
Furthermore, the experiment could implement a random payout selection. This rule
would randomly identify the results of a round to compensate the subjects (Kalambokidis
et al., 2012). The enhancements identified could be used to better mimic a real world
environment and assess true taxpayer behavior.
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APPENDICES
XI.1 Appendix A: Test Questionnaire
You have been asked to play the role of the typical small business owner with
four fulltime employees. Your business gross receipts are $350,000 dollars for this
round. Your industry operating expenses are estimated to be around 20% of gross
receipts and other expenses (such as cost of goods sold) are approximately 40% of gross
receipts.
During this round, you should expect to operate as if it were a normal business
environment. This will include paying your accounts payable, overhead, and taxes for
your business. You will also be required to finalize a tax form, and should expect for all
current laws to apply as you file and pay employment tax. In addition, you should expect
the normal application of the law and that legal system will work its way through as
expected.
Over the past several years, your business has experienced normal economic
conditions and you have experienced average sales numbers, which you expect will grow
at a normal rate in the future. In addition, your firm has maintained strong cash flow and
your accounts receivables and accounts payables are up to date. With respect to your
employees, you have had no issues paying their salaries and have made all the quarterly
employment tax withholding deposits.
During this round, the Experiment Authorities will not conduct any audits.
The following information will help in assessing your company’s financial
situation for this questionnaire. You must use the information provided to determine the
employment tax obligation.
1. Your company gross receipts were $350,000 this quarter.
2. Your firm employs four (4) full time fulltime employees.
a. Their average income was $15,250 for the quarter, a calculation
which totals $61,000 or (4 x $15,250) in labor costs.
b. Your employment tax per employee should be relatively easy to
pay at $2,500 per employee. This totals $10,000 per quarter for all
employees.
3. Your employees' federal withholding for employment tax is $10,000 (This
is money withheld from employees’ income to be deposited to the
Enforcement Authorities by the employer).
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Simplified Balance Sheet
Accounts Receivables

Debits

$350,000

Gross Receipts (Revenue)
Wages, tips, and other compensation

$61,000

Employment tax (Employer's Portion)

$10,000

Operating expenses (e.g., rent, utility, etc.)

$70,000

Other Expenses (e.g., COGS, inventory, etc.)
Total Expenses
Net Income

Credits

$140,000
(-$281,000)

$61,000
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XI.2 Appendix B: IRS Tax Form 944
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XI.3 Appendix C: Recruitment Script and Hand-out
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XI.4 Appendix D: Additional literature review
XI.4.1 Corporate responsibility
The corporate responsibility literature has discussed such constructs as brand
reputation and social responsibility as they are associated with the filing and payment of
taxes. At the center of the work on brand reputation is how firms manage their public
perception as a social steward when designing tax strategies. Currently companies are
managing their tax strategies by assessing how aggressive the public perceives the
company tax strategies (Donohoe et al., 2014; Harvey Jr, 2014). If a firm is perceived as
too aggressive by the public, the public perception may impact the company’s filing
strategy (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009). Moreover, companies that demonstrate higher levels
of corporate social responsibility were more likely to engage in lower levels of tax
avoidance (Dowling, 2014; Lanis & Richardson, 2015) and, therefore, choose less
aggressive tax strategies.
The link being made in with this literature review is how subjective norms effect
individual actions. While individual filings are private and the exerted behavior is not a
public, the subjective norm link could be considers tenuous. However, corporate filings
are not private and connection on reputation and subjective norms could be derived.
Since corporate tax literature was used as a proxy for the segment studied (small
business), it could be suggested that corporate responsibility can affect employment tax
behaviors in small business in similar fashion – not identical fashion.
XI.4.2 Employment Tax and Tax Incidence
In economics, the term-of-art tax incidence is used as a framing for who
ultimately is responsible for paying the tax. The general perception is that the individual
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consuming the product pays the taxes. However, that is not always the case. To
illustrate this concept, let us discuss the consumption of labor. Firms consume labor. In
times of economic decline, the number of employee vis-à-vis jobs is higher (i.e., an
excess of labor). In such time, employers do not have increase wage to acquire new
labors, and thus any increase in employment tax will be passed to employees because
employees will accept less favorable job in such economic circumstances. In times of
economic expansion, the number of employee vis-à-vis jobs is lower (i.e., a shortage of
labor). In such time, employers would have increase wage to acquire new labors, and
thus any increase in employment tax will be borne by employer.
In terms of labor markets, the party (either employer or employee) with the
highest price elasticity of labor will pay a smaller portion of the tax. The literature has
shown that this tax is more commonly “borne by labour” (pg. 189) (Hamermesh, 1979;
Holmlund, 1981; Vroman, 1974). The literature has also shows that employment tax
incidence has a bigger impact on the wage earning class than the investment class. This
impact due because the investment class’s effective income is lower than the wage
earning class (Sugin, 2014) and because the payroll tax has increased in the US from 4.2
percent to 6.2 percent in 2013 “as part of the fiscal cliff resolution” (pg. 94) (Bracha &
Cooper, 2013).44 The increase of employment tax has an impact on effective wages,
which may lead to increase noncompliance of self-employed taxpayers who may be
trying to increase their real wages.
Other studies have analyzed the impact of different taxes on income (e.g., income
tax versus payroll tax). Some studies have shown that payroll taxes are a greater
44

1, 2013.

The changes required the payroll tax to revert to the previous level on January
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proportion of the tax incidence for the majority of US households because the average
household has a larger proportion of wage income than investment income (Heim et al.,
2014; Mitrusi & Poterba, 2001). Studies concluded that payroll taxes are becoming a
greater portion of the tax incidence because of the introduction of the EITC, which
reduces taxable income. On the other hand, there have been no significant changes in the
employment tax law. Moreover, Heim et al. (2014) explains that the positive payment of
employment tax has decreased from 79 percent to 75 percent between 2001 and 2011.
From these aforementioned studies, we can infer that employment tax is
becoming a larger portion of the tax incidence for wage earners and that the tax incidence
has decreased over the last decade. Nevertheless, the authors do not articulate a causal
reason as to why these changes are taking place. They do attribute some of these changes
to the great recession and changes in the code,45 but these attributions are not based on
research.
To be able to assess the employment tax incident, we also must understand how
employment tax affects the supply of labor. Some research studies have discusses how
decreases in payroll taxes increase labor participation due to a reduction in employment
tax (Creedy, 2010; Engelhardt & Kumar, 2014; Kugler & Kugler, 2009). In other words,
a decrease in payroll tax will increase labor supply because of an increase in real wages
and a reduction in labor cost (Goerke, 2002; Månsson & Quoreshi, 2015; Saez et al.,
2012b). This suggested increase in labor supply the tax incident on employees, which
would have little impact on employment tax compliance. On the other hand, a reduction

45

The change in the Code refers to the decrease in the payroll tax from 6.2 to 4.2
in 2010 to 2013.
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on the supply of labor could affect employment tax compliance because employers have
to make the payments.
What is the challenge to understanding the impact of employment tax
compliance? MacRae and MacRae (1976) show that the supply of labor would not
change with an increase in the payroll tax because there would be and offset between
elastic and inelastic workers. Moffitt (1977) clarifies that the offsets occur when the
budget constraint is linear, but a non-linear budget constraint would lead to a reduction in
labor supply46 anytime a payroll tax increase. In general, the literature shows that there
is an inverse relation between labor supply and tax changes, but with more complex
models with additional dimensions of taxpayer behavior, the relationship between labor
supply and tax changes is ambiguous or negligible (Bauer & Riphahn, 2002; Collins &
Plumlee, 1991; Cruces, Galiani, & Kidyba, 2010; Moffitt, 1977). Because of mixed
results in the empirical studies, there is no clear way to identify how employment tax
incident influences its compliance.
Beyond the tax incidence and its impact on labor and wages, a paper defined
payroll tax dilemma. The payroll tax dilemma is when a firm cannot meet its operational
liabilities and it uses employment tax withholdings to pay for these liabilities (Godfrey,
2004; Mauldin & Wilder, 1997). Companies normally face a liquidity crisis during
economic downturns or economic distress, such as the great recession (Grady, 2013).
Grady (2013) indicates that many of these businesses continue to illegally borrow from
withheld taxes for expanded periods of time, and found that the majority of those
businesses will eventually fail. Bloomquist (2003a) also argues that a financial strain is
46

Most studies focus on the labor supply (instead of labor demand) because
employees had borne the cost of an increase in employment tax.
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one of the determinants of noncompliance for all taxpayers. One of the arguments of this
study is that some of the authorized individual will succumb to the payroll tax dilemma
when confronting a liquidity crisis (or strain). The argument is that individuals decide to
use employment tax withholding as a short-term loan without clearly understanding the
negative implications.
XI.4.3 Characteristics of non-filers
Much of the compliance literature focuses on non-filers because they introduce
biases on the outcome of all predictions. The consequence of non-filers is that the
absence of their data makes all noncompliance appear less fraudulent. Therefore,
understanding non-filers is essential to minimize noncompliance (Feinstein, 1991). The
inability to adjust the data (e.g., using weights) for non-filers increases the tax gap,
reduces our understanding of tax compliance behavior, and impedes proper compliance
enforcement.
Erard and Ho (2001) identified non-filers as “ghosts” (pg.26) because very little is
known about this segment of the tax base. More explicitly, they labeled these taxpayers
as ghosts because they do not comply with any filing requirements and it is very difficult
for authorities or academic to identify or locate them. The non-filers in Erard and Ho’s
(2001) study were located by the IRS through “intensive search by IRS agents” (pg. 30).
They explain that if an individual is hard to find it would increase the taxpayer’s
willingness not to file.
Erard and Ho’s (2001) also found that variables such as prior filing, marital status,
and age could be used to identify known filer. For instance, older taxpayers are less
likely to be noncompliance. The general consensus is that they are more risk adverse.
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On the other hand, married couples are more likely to be noncompliant because their
taxes are more complex and lead to more evasion. This view is consistent with Andreoni
et al. (1998), Clotfelter (1983), and Feinstein (1991) studies. These studies found that the
complexity of tax filing has an impact on taxpayers. For example, Erard and Ho’s (2001)
found that taxpayers who are at the margin of the filing requirement may be deterred
from complying because of the cost associated with filing taxes. They also found that
non-filers are more likely to be recipients of blue-collar business income, and are more
likely to have their source of income from business or capital gains. Again, suggesting
that lack of detection increases noncompliance.
The most interesting characteristic of ghosts is that income and taxable income
are substantially smaller than other filers, and ghosts use less adjustment than other filers
(Erard & Ho, 2001). This is interesting because one of their suggestions associated with
this behavior was that the non-filer would appear as an accidently noncompliant taxpayer,
instead of deliberate act of evasion. This act of evasion draws attention to the issues of
normative beliefs and subjective norms (Bloomquist, 2003b; Fischer et al., 1992).
Normative beliefs are defined as the established behaviors, and it is assumed that all
individuals will behave according to expectations (Ajzen, 1991; CSLI, 2011). Subjective
norm is the peer pressure to behave in a certain way (Chatzisarantis & Biddle, 1998).
The collective of normative beliefs of an individual is the foundation of his\her subjective
norms (Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, it could be derived that these ghosts believe the act of
non-compliance is acceptable at the individual and group level.
As with tax literature, compliance literature has also has shown that individuals’
compliance will be affected similar belief and norms, and provides three plausible causes:
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Embracement of apprehension



Satisfaction with the government or fiscal equity



Fairness of the tax system
Gordon (1989) study examined the concept of morality as deterrence of tax

evasion. Morality is affected by to forces: internal and external. The internal force could
be described and an individual’s ethics. He proposes that individuals with high ethical
standards will continue to properly and voluntaries comply even when the cost of evading
are substantially lower than the gains. The external forces can simply be explained as
peer influence. He specifies reputation cost of being apprehended. There are two
alternative outcomes. If there are many people being apprehended, noncompliance
becomes a batch of honor and it may increase. On the other hand, if within a group, the
evader is alone. He/she may feel a sense of shame because of the reputational cost,
leading to improved compliance.
In his study, Gordon (1989) also found that “small evaders” (pg. 804) were more
likely to become noncompliant as tax rate increased. Small evaders were defined as
taxpayers who were already underreporting their taxes. Whereby, “non-evaders” (pg.
800) were less likely to change their filing behavior because the decision was not a
monetary decision, but ethical. The ethical decision was based on personal cost of
breaking the law, and the reputational cost associated with being apprehended.
As mentioned above, there appears to be a relationship between perceptions of
fiscal equity tax compliance. Fiscal equity could be defined as perception on treatment of
taxpayer, the level of taxpayer burden, and complexity of the code (Bloomquist, 2003a).
An example of inequity could be a progressive tax, such as the income tax, where
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taxpayers in the upper income brackets are required to pay more as a proportion of their
income. Conversely, a regressive tax, such as sales tax, could be consider inequitable for
taxpayers in the lower income brackets because they would be required to pay more taxes
as a proportion of their income.
Another source of inequity was identified by Piketty and Saez (2003). In their
paper, they provide IRS time series data on income, and it showed that income inequality
over the last few decades has increased. Bloomquist (2003a) explain how income
inequality influences overall reporting compliance, basing most of her argument on the
concealment sources of income. On the other hand, she emphasizes how the lack of
taxpayers’ financial stability due to income inequality leads to noncompliance. She
argues that because individuals’ future expected cost of detection is lower than the
present need for money. In other words, individuals’ calculations of potential outcomes
are biased due to temporal distance and individuals many times believe that the rosy
outcome will prevail (Pennington & Roese, 2003).47 This is due to people’s inability to
accurately and consistently predict future outcomes (Kahneman, 2011). Therefore,
taxpayers expected utility maximization formulation is incorrect and it results in
noncompliance.
Spicer and Becker (1980) also provide empirical evidence that the relationship
does exist between equity and compliance. Their theoretical argument is based on
expected utility theory and “inequity theory” (pg. 174), and it stresses that individuals
will use tax evasion as a vehicle to adjust inequities. They propose that if tax equity is
perceived favorable to the taxpayer, he/she will reduce his/her noncompliance level. For
47

This optimistic outlook could also be due to insensitivity to predictability
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)
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example, Bloomquist (2003a) provides evidence of this phenomenon using data
following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In her findings, lower effective taxes on the
wealthiest American lead to better compliance. On the other hand, if tax equity hinders
taxpayer, he/she will increase the tax evasion level.
Spicer and Becker (1980) results showed that “victims” (pg. 171) of inequity
would increase their noncompliance behavior. This finding is also collaborated by Alm
et al. (1992), which explained that to increase compliance the government should make
individuals aware of how their taxes are benefiting those who pay. Examples of this
could be Washington State DOT, Miami-Dade County (FL) transportation, and Forsyth
County (GA). All of these governmental bodies provide some source of communiqué
near public work sites to show taxpayers’ how their taxes are being used.
They too study the relationship between equity and compliance, and found a
causal effect between the two. Studies claim that level of satisfaction with government
services and will have an impact on compliance level (Alm, 1991; Alm et al., 1992).
Lastly, fairness is based on the individuals’ perception of how many people are getting
away with evading taxes (Andreoni et al., 1998; Erard, 1997; Erard & Ho, 2001). If
individuals perceive that a large number of people are evading taxes, they too are likely
to underreport.
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